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Introduction 
This thesis explores the relationship between John Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost and two 
of his prose works, namely Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, with 
particular emphasis on the gender politics of these three works. Paradise Lost revisits many 
of the issues that are also examined by Milton in Areopagitica and The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, matters such as free will, individual responsibility, marriage, and 
gender. The relationship between Paradise Lost, Areopagitica and The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce is complicated and multiplex. Indeed, the reworking of both 
Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce in Paradise Lost is of a highly 
ambiguous nature, especially in its portrayal of gender. This thesis attempts to demonstrate 
the ambiguous nature of the reworking of Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce in Paradise Lost and argues that the poem re-examines rather than merely confirms 
many of the issues presented in these prose works. For a better understanding of the newer 
trend in Milton studies towards stressing discontinuity and contradiction (a trend which this 
thesis is a prime example of), I will attempt to characterise some of the existing Milton 
scholarship, with particular emphasis on the two prevailing paradigms within Milton 
criticism. Furthermore, as this thesis focusses primarily on gender, I will take into account 
some of the Milton scholarship that deals with gender specifically in order to investigate if a 
similar trend towards stressing discontinuity and contradiction occurs in this branch of Milton 
scholarship. Furthermore, I will analyse both Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline 
of Divorce by itself as well as in connection with Paradise Lost in chapter 1 and 2. 
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Milton Scholarship: Two Paradigms 
Dobranski explains that “an industry of Milton criticism sprang up shortly after his death as 
readers pored over and commented on his prose and poetry” (“Afterlife” 196). It is difficult to 
accurately categorise Milton scholarship (especially contemporary Milton scholarship) 
because it is so extensive. Indeed, Rumrich explains that “it cannot be described as uniform, 
[…] except in a rough way and at the most basic level” (“Critical Responses” 2). However, it 
is possible to distinguish between two different interpretive paradigms, the first one being the 
paradigm of “imposing certainty on an unruly Miltonic text”, as Herman and Sauer put it in 
their introduction to The New Milton Criticism (3). Milton scholars within this paradigm 
typically attempt to resolve any inconsistencies and ambiguities within Milton’s writing. 
Elaborating, Herman and Sauer explain that 
while discontinuities in Milton’s works have long been noted, Miltonists have 
traditionally regarded them as anomalies, and the critics who opted to explore, 
without resolving, them were often designated as marginal, or outliers in the 
field. The predilection for coherence and resolution in Milton studies has led 
Nigel Smith to observe that “the nature and complexity of [Milton’s] 
contradictory energy is not appreciated, even by Milton specialists”. (1) 
Perhaps the best-known example of this paradigm within the early tradition of Milton 
criticism is John Dryden, who openly rewrote certain passages of Paradise Lost in an attempt 
to restore certainty and resolve the problem that, for instance, Milton’s God poses (Herman 
and Sauer 4, 5). Another way in which Dryden attempts to render Paradise Lost less 
ambiguous is through his famous statement that the poem “would have had a stronger claim 
to epic status if Milton had not made Satan rather than Adam its hero” (Evans 145). 
Undoubtedly, Milton’s Satan, with his ambivalent character and the sympathy he inspires in 
readers, is a problem for Dryden that needs to be resolved. Wittreich states that Dryden’s 
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strategy in rewriting Paradise Lost is to restore the poem to certainty and “to cancel out 
Miltonic ambiguity” (qtd. in Herman and Sauer 5). Later, it is Zachary Pearce who 
continuously tries to resolve the contradictions within Milton’s poem and restore it to 
certainty (Herman and Sauer 5, 7). Already, the first critical reception to Paradise Lost 
showcases a certain compulsion to stabilise the poem, and therefore to stabilise Milton 
(Herman and Sauer 6). Indeed, eighteenth-century criticism of Paradise Lost is characterised 
by “related efforts to address misgivings about the poem” (Herman and Sauer 5).  Herman 
and Sauer continue to claim that there is a “gravitational pull toward unification in Milton 
studies” (10) and that the dominant paradigm in this field of criticism is inclined towards “a 
unifying imperative and the reining in of contrary energies” (11). Wittreich acknowledges 
this tendency, stating that “the controversy over Miltonic certainty and the critical attempt at 
imposing orthodoxy has been in place for centuries now” (“Afterword” 239). Evidently, 
much of early Milton criticism is characterised by the need to resolve ambiguities within 
Milton’s writing. 
Gradually, a new tradition in Milton criticism arrived. Certain major themes and 
issues that held a prominent place within the earlier tradition of Milton scholarship and 
criticism no longer seem to be of much concern to Milton scholars. Most notably, there seems 
to be a relative lack of interest in the longstanding argument about Milton’s Satan in Paradise 
Lost (Evans 144, 145). Then, from the mid 1980s onwards, a new Milton criticism became 
more apparent. Crucial to this was “a growing awareness of [Milton’s] heterodoxies” (Evans 
145). Scholars and critics such as Mary Nyquist, Balachandra Rajan, Paul Stevens, Thomas 
N. Corns, and John P. Rumrich all showed a newly found interest in “uncertainty as a 
constituent element in Milton’s writings, thereby opening up opportunities to identify and 
work through new problems” (Herman and Sauer 11). More and more, Milton’s works came 
to be seen as ambiguous rather than as a unified whole (Herman and Sauer 12).  
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This leads us to the second paradigm within Milton scholarship, which moves away 
from the compulsion to stabilise Milton and the need to impose certainty on his texts, 
resisting “the reading of Milton into coherence” (Herman and Sauer 1). Rather, Milton critics 
increasingly acknowledge that uncertainty is a constituent element within Milton studies and 
should be treated as such, now regarding his work as “conflicted rather than serene” 
(Wittreich “Afterword” 239, Herman and Sauer 1). While certainty was once a default 
assumption within Milton scholarship and criticism, this is no longer the case. Evans explains 
that something fundamental is happening to Milton criticism: “Milton’s works are now 
beginning to be seen as sites of contention and conflict rather than unified verbal and 
intellectual structures or syntheses of heterogeneous ideas and values” (qtd. in Herman and 
Sauer 12). Miltonists are “increasingly open to “Milton’s pluralism,” whether in the form of 
generic ambiguity, riddling contradiction, or interpretive uncertainty, all of which are aspects 
of a world wherein deception curtails perception, indeed creates a crisis in perception” 
(Wittreich “Afterword” 244). Indeed, this new trend in Milton studies towards stressing 
discontinuity and contradiction is crucial to the second paradigm within Milton scholarship. 
Furthermore, this new interpretive paradigm also more often deals with aspects of Milton’s 
works that have previously been neglected. An example of this would be “the remarkable 
upsurge of critical interest in [Milton’s] prose works” (Evans 146). 
However, not all Milton critics agree with this new interpretive paradigm. On the 
contrary, some critics, amongst whom notably Stanley Fish, are “bent upon returning Milton 
to orthodoxy” (Wittreich “Afterword” 239), sharing much of the views of Dryden and other 
scholars within the early tradition of Milton criticism. Wittreich explains that  
to get Milton right, the critic must accept, according to Fish, that Milton’s is 
an unchanging mind; that his vision is coherent, harmonious, and unified; that 
the function of criticism is not to put meaning into play, but to arrest its play – 
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to isolate, determine, and proclaim the meaning, the single meaning, of a text. 
(“Afterword” 239) 
Indeed, Fish banishes any existence of ambiguity or doubt in Milton’s work, and strongly 
asserts that “conflict, ambivalence, and open-endedness – the watchwords of a criticism that 
would make Milton into the Romantic liberal some of his readers want him to be – are not 
constitutive features of the poetry but products of a systematic misreading of it” (qtd. in 
Herman and Sauer 11). According to Fish, Milton’s writing is not equivocal at all: rather, it is 
straightforward and unambiguous, and any other reading is automatically faulty.  
However, I strongly disagree with Fish’s view of Milton’s work as wholly consistent, 
involving one coherent set of ideas and principles. On the contrary, I find Milton’s poetry – 
Paradise Lost in particular – to be highly conflicted, especially with regard to Milton’s 
conception of issues such as free will, individual responsibility, marriage and gender. In 
Paradise Lost, Milton revisits these issues at multiple occasions, but he never seems to adopt 
a stable, definitive view on them. Instead, Milton’s poem is replete with complications and 
uncertainties: Rumrich explains that Milton “consistently maintained that indeterminacy and 
differences of opinion are inevitable among imperfect creatures in an unfinished world” 
(“The Question of Context” 37). Indeed, this notion of indeterminacy within Milton’s work 
can be traced back to Areopagitica, in which Milton expressly states that the “truth lies 
scattered in pieces and “we have not yet found them all … nor ever shall do, till her Master’s 
second coming” (Rumrich “The Question of Context” 37). Precisely because uncertainty is a 
key element of life according to Milton, it is also prevalent in his writing, something which 
this thesis attempts to demonstrate. This work belongs to the second interpretive paradigm 
within Milton scholarship as it acknowledges and highlights the existence of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in Milton’s writing, rather than attempting to stabilise his work.  
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Methodological Introduction: Gender 
With regard to the gender politics of Milton’s writing, criticism of Milton’s Paradise Lost in 
particular remains divided: the poem is mainly regarded either as proof of Milton’s blatant 
misogyny, or as an illustration of his progressive views with regard to the female gender. 
Scholars such as John Halkett, for instance, conclude that Milton’s divorce tracts as well as 
Paradise Lost itself present “consistently progressive views on the subject [of gender]” 
(Martin “Introduction” 4). Indeed, Milton is “renowned widely by many for being one of the 
first proponents of “companionate marriage”, a marriage in which the man and woman are 
equal partners” (Ziegelmann and Singh). Seen by many as an early advocate of women’s 
rights and equality in marriage, Milton claims that equality in love and happiness must exist, 
a notion that goes far beyond Biblical canon law (Ziegelmann and Singh 2, 4). Milton’s 
argument as proposed in his divorce tracts clearly threatens the traditional authority of men 
over their wives, and therefore it appealed strongly to contemporary feminists, “who 
appreciated his subtle deployment of the logic of Pauline headship against itself, [and] 
immediately put it to work in releasing themselves from domestic bondage” (Martin 
“Introduction” 3). Scholars such as Diane McColley and Joseph Wittreich seem to affirm this 
view of the progressive Milton: “McColley showed that Milton’s portrait of our “grand 
mother” effectively reversed a thoroughly misogynistic tradition”, whereas Wittreich 
considered “the reader responses of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century women” to 
demonstrate that these women continued to regard Milton’s female portraits as positive role 
models (Martin “Introduction” 4). 
However, in spite of Milton’s seemingly progressive stance on gender, Martin 
explains that “several complex crosscurrents in Milton’s writing about gender partially 
undermine [any] positive re-evaluations” (“Introduction” 8).  Indeed, critics such as Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar are among those who view Milton as a blatant misogynist. In 
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Madwoman in the Attic, Gilbert and Gubar conclude “that Milton’s views on women were at 
best inconsistent, and at worst, consistently masculinist” (Martin “Introduction” 4). These 
critics are convinced that Milton’s idea of a companionate marriage is not only not feminist, 
but deeply masculinist. Martin explains: 
Drawing on well-known facts about Milton’s ill-advised marriage to Mary 
Powell and the legend of his “serviceable” daughters, these critics have 
concluded that the poet clearly failed to extend his concept of Christian liberty 
to women. Thus, despite their claim to legalize divorce for the “good of both 
sexes,” his divorce tracts actually continue the battles of the sexes by other 
means. (“Dalila” 54) 
Indeed, many critics insist that Milton infused his own misogynistic views in his writing: 
Ziegelmann and Singh explain that “while seemingly encouraging the idea of a companionate 
marriage within Paradise Lost, [Milton] also embues the great Christian epic with notions of 
Eve’s frailty, vanity, and stupidity” (8). Furthermore, Milton’s fixation on spiritual 
compatibility led some critics to conclude that he “came dangerously close to demanding a 
perfect Stepford-type wife” (Martin “Introduction” 8). Indeed, as Joseph Wittreich also 
concludes from researching the reader responses of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
women, “from the mid nineteenth century onward, “first wave” feminists became 
increasingly suspicious of the “angel of the hearth” roles associated with Milton’s Eve, and 
by the time “second wave” feminists came along in the 1970s, these suspicions had turned 
into active disdain” (Martin “Introduction” 4).  
Clearly, there is no consensus between these two very different and strongly argued 
positions. This lack of consensus is also attested by Julia Walker’s Milton and the Idea of 
Woman, which presents a considerable range of opinion on Milton’s depiction of women 
(Martin “Introduction” 5). Martin accurately summarises the dissension in Milton scholarship 
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with regard to gender as follows: “either as his contemporaries believed, Milton’s ideals were 
too advanced for the men of his age (perhaps including himself); or they are misogynistic by 
any standard, contemporary or modern” (“Dalila” 54). Indeed, Martin goes on to explain that  
even when insisting that his doctrine would free women as well as men, and 
even when reserving his sharpest sarcasm for male contemporaries who clung 
to the traditional view that women possessed neither the mental nor the 
spiritual ability to become true “mates,” [Milton’s] divorce tracts remained 
under a deeper cloud than ever. (“Introduction” 8) 
Evidently, mainline Milton criticism remains deeply divided about Milton’s portrayal of 
gender in his work. Much of the debate centres on the idea that many critics have 
overemphasised Milton as a progressive thinker: in her essay “How Free are Milton’s 
Women?”, Susanne Woods concludes that “Milton’s women are not as free as his men, but 
nonetheless are responsible for their actions; thus, while Milton’s male supremacy may be 
that of his time, as an author he is in subtle and complex ways moving towards greater liberty 
for women” (Polydorou 22). Susan Miller concludes that it is the very duality of Paradise 
Lost that “has allowed critics to argue contradictory positions about the representation of 
women” (“Serpentine Eve” 46). The dissension in Milton scholarship with regard to gender is 
due to the simple fact that Milton himself wrestled with his views on women and how to 
portray them in his writing. Indeed, Ziegelmann and Singh claim that “Milton's 
understanding of women is as debatable as his definition of marriage” (2), and that “Milton 
himself was conflicted about his own attitudes towards women” (6).  
Milton’s fluctuating conception and depiction of gender may be explained by means 
of the second interpretive paradigm within Milton scholarship. A similar trend towards 
stressing discontinuity and contradiction is present within the gender branch of Milton 
scholarship: Ziegelmann and Singh assert that “rather than accepting one notion over the 
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other, it is perhaps the contradictions within Paradise Lost which most accurately convey 
Milton’s view of women” (12). Increasingly, critics accept that Milton’s conception of gender 
in Paradise Lost especially is polyphonous and discontinuous. Ziegelmann and Singh 
elaborate: 
critics themselves have often highlighted the crux of the Miltonic problem; 
Milton is neither misogynist or feminist, monster or savior, he, like any great 
literary mind, is able to construct the issue in such a way that it can readily be 
absorbed and debated by a great many people, religious or secular, male or 
female. If one finds his argument lacking in any regard, this lack is often 
accentuated by the reader’s own biases and opinions. (22) 
I wholeheartedly agree with Ziegelmann and Singh: indeed, this thesis itself is a sterling 
example of the newer trend in Milton scholarship towards stressing discontinuity and 
contradiction, as it aims to show the irregularities and uncertainties of Milton’s writing, with 
special emphasis on Milton’s conception and depiction of gender in Paradise Lost. Milton’s 
epic poem is “far more rife with contradictions than any masculinist or feminist scholar 
would like to admit. It is these contradictions, in and of themselves, which are our most 
important clue as to the mind and intent of Milton” (Ziegelmann and Singh 14). There is not a 
single Miltonic conception of gender: rather, his imagining of gender varies over time, in 
different works, and even within a poem like Paradise Lost itself. Indeed, Milton returns to 
the issue of gender numerous times within his works, but he never seems to adopt a stable, 
definitive view on it.  
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Chapter 1: Areopagitica 
1.1 Areopagitica: Context 
Milton published Areopagitica in November 1644. His aim in publishing and spreading 
Areopagitica becomes clear from the subtitle of this pamphlet: it is “a Speech of Mr. John 
Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England” (175, Fulton 89). 
Milton specifically responds to Parliament’s 1643 Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing, 
also known as the Licensing Order of 1643. Milton directly addresses Parliament in 
Areopagitica, arguing against their order “to regulate printing, that no book, pamphlet, or 
paper shall be henceforth printed, unless the same be first approved and licensed by such” 
(178). With this order, Parliament decides to reinstate government control over printing 
(Blasi 3). In order to publish their work, authors were required to have a license approved by 
the government. Blasi explains that  
a small number of master printers was authorized to operate presses. Those 
who held printing patents were enlisted […] to search out and bring to justice 
all who printed without a license. […] Specialized licensers were appointed to 
examine writings in specified categories. Four censors were named, for 
example, to scrutinize law books, three for books of philosophy and history, 
one for “mathematics, almanacks, and prognostications”. Parliament served as 
the enforcement agency, usually through its committees. Not only miscreant 
authors and printers but also licensers who had been too permissive were 
subject to imprisonment. (3) 
As Stephen Dobranski explains, it was “public reaction to Milton’s position on 
divorce that prompted him to publish Areopagitica in November 1644. Responding to calls 
that his divorce tract should be censored, Milton decided to take up his pen on behalf of 
freedom of the press” (“Prose” 117). Furthermore, Milton apparently wanted to have a 
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license to publish The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce but was denied approval, after 
which he “published his tract in defiance of the law” (Blasi 4-5). It is quite possible that his 
personal experience with censorship prompted Milton to write Areopagitica. It should be 
noted, however, that while Milton is most certainly opposed to licensed printing, stating “give 
me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all 
liberties” (208), it becomes clear that he is not fully against all types of censorship. In fact, 
similar to the tradition of Ancient Greece, Milton does advocate censorship in the case of 
libellous or blasphemous writings – though after, and not before publication (Chernaik 321). 
 
1.2 Areopagitica: Core Argument 
Milton divides his argument in Areopagitica against Parliament’s Licensing Order into four 
parts. Firstly, he traces the idea of licensing back to whom he sees as its inventors, namely the 
popes of Rome. Secondly, he discusses the act of reading and the nature of books. Thirdly, 
Milton explains how Parliament’s Licensing Order cannot possibly achieve its intended aim. 
Lastly, he discusses the possible effects that this order may have on “learning and […] 
national religious and political renewal” (Blasi 5). In the following paragraphs I will 
elaborate on and further clarify each of Milton’s arguments as presented in Areopagitica. 
Milton starts his argument against the Licensing Order by making a comparison 
between Parliament’s order and the way books were traditionally treated in Ancient Greece 
and the Roman Empire. In Athens, only two sorts of writings were banished or burned: 
writings that were blasphemous in nature, or libellous and defamatory writings (179). By 
tracing the origins of the banishing, burning and prohibiting of books in classical antiquity, 
Milton attempts to establish a connection between the act of licensing and Roman 
Catholicism: he is able to trace the licensing of books all the way back to the popes of Rome, 
who started the notion of licensed printing (182). Milton’s primary goal is to identify the 
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practice of licensed printing with Roman Catholicism in an attempt to “otherise” it: in fact, 
Milton calls the invention and the act of licensed printing “anti-christian” (183, Blasi 5). 
Milton believes that for a piece of writing to be judged or censored before it is even “born” 
(i.e. published) is “tyrannous” (183). By establishing a connection between licensed printing 
and Roman Catholicism, Milton is able to portray licensed printing as “a relatively recent 
expedient, eschewed throughout history by enlightened states, and always characterized by 
selective enforcement for ulterior ends” (Blasi 5). According to Milton, censors from the 
Catholic church did not confine themselves to “matters heretical, but any subject that was not 
to their palate they either condemned in a prohibition or had it straight into the new purgatory 
of an index” (182). Indeed, Milton views the inventors of licensed printing (the popes of 
Rome) as “those whom ye will be loath to own” (178) and stresses that the English people 
should distance themselves from them completely.  
After tracing the origins of licensed printing, Milton goes on to discuss the act of 
reading and the nature of books in quite some detail. He stresses the value of reading and 
characterises books as “the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred 
them” (178). In fact, books are so valuable that they are given religious importance in 
Areopagitica as well: to Milton, “he who destroys a good book kills reason itself, kills the 
image of God” (178). Emphasising the need to allow the publication of good and bad books 
alike, Milton argues that “the only way to prove one’s virtue is to know evil and still to 
choose good” (Dobranski “Prose” 122). Men should be able to “read any books whatever 
come to [their] hands, for [they] art sufficient both to judge aright and to examine each 
matter” (185). According to Milton, books should not be censored or licensed before 
publishing: men should be able to decide for themselves whether a book is either good or 
bad. Claiming that “to the pure, all things are pure” (185), Milton argues that bad books 
simply do not have the ability to corrupt good and pure people. In fact, bad books to good and 
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pure minds serve to illustrate danger and to forewarn of evil (186). Milton illustrates this 
point with examples from the Bible: even Moses, Daniel and Paul, as well as the great 
theologians of early Christianity, profited from reading works by heathen authors, as the best 
way “to scout into the regions of sin and falsity” is “by reading all manner of tractates and 
hearing all manner of reason” (187, Blasi 5, Dobranski “Prose” 122). Indeed, Milton makes it 
evident that he cannot praise a “fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, 
that never sallies out and sees her adversary” (187). Naturally, it is easy to be a good 
Christian when you are a hermit – there is no temptation or trial to be found. To Milton, this 
is but a “blank virtue” (187). Without the knowledge of vice in the world, we cannot be 
wholly virtuous and therefore it is imperative to read “all manner of reason” (187). While 
Milton acknowledges that books that are “promiscuously read” (187) may have harmful 
consequences, he is of the opinion that heretical notions will always find different ways to 
spread without necessarily having to rely on the written medium (Blasi 5). Furthermore, one 
should be strong enough to withstand said heretical notions and one becomes strong enough 
through the acquisition of knowledge, which includes the knowledge of evil gained through 
reading. Blasi explains that “what checks the spread of sin is the strength and will of the 
populace, fortified by knowledge […]. When discussing the benefits of the freedom he 
advocates, Milton repeatedly speaks of its strengthening effect on the character of the reader” 
(5). Books are described as “useful drugs and materials wherewith to temper and compose 
effective and strong medicines which man’s life cannot want” (189). Books, then, good or 
bad, help men gain knowledge which may be used as a strong medicine throughout life.  
The third part of Milton’s argument in Areopagitica concerns the practicalities of 
Parliament’s Licensing Order. Milton firmly believes that the Licensing Order cannot 
possibly achieve its intended aim, which is to prevent wrongdoing. Milton likens 
Parliament’s attempt to prevent wrongdoing by licensing books to “the exploit of that gallant 
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man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his park gate” (189). Parliament’s 
Licensing Order is merely a partial and ineffective attempt to prevent wrongdoing and have 
control over citizen’s expressions and thoughts. Blasi explains that “for control to be 
effective, all the sources of sin must be addressed: songs, dances, lutes, whispers at balconies, 
food and drink, wanton clothing, temptations to idleness” (6). It does not do to focus on 
writing alone: according to Milton, it is a futile endeavour. Moreover, Milton questions the 
position of the licensers themselves. It is extremely difficult to find staff who are able to 
judge writings wisely and justly, for licensers themselves are not infallible and are prone to 
make misjudgements and mistakes. Evidently, there are numerous practical concerns with 
regard to the effectiveness of Parliament’s Licensing Order.  
Lastly, the final and longest part of Milton’s argument involves the effects the 
Licensing Order may have on learning and on “national religious and political renewal” 
(Blasi 5). Central to the final part of Milton’s argument is the acquisition of knowledge, 
which is hindered by Parliament’s attempt at censorship. Milton explicitly states that 
licensing can do no good, and expands on “the manifest hurt it causes in being […] the 
greatest discouragement and affront that can be offered to learning and to learned men” 
(194). In his chapter on Areopagitica in The Oxford Handbook of Milton, Blair Hoxby 
explains what this “manifest hurt” may involve: 
Milton argues that the Licensing Order is an affront to Englishmen because it 
deprives them of their Christian and their civil liberty in one fell blow. Seen as 
an instrument of tyranny, it imposes a form of ‘bondage’ and ‘undeserved 
thralldom’ that threatens to deepen the ‘slavish print’ that the ‘yoke of outward 
conformity’ has already left on their necks. It threatens, in other words, to turn 
them into a people with a servile disposition. (227) 
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Milton argues that licensed printing stifles disputation and debate between men, both of 
which are beneficial not only for the individual soul, but also for the “elect nation” (Blasi 6). 
Dobranski explains that to Milton, the danger of licensed printing lies not in simply making 
the English nation as a whole less knowledgeable, but the true risk it poses is that it also 
makes people less perceptive, which is arguably worse (“Prose” 122). People will stop 
thinking for themselves, and ultimately, licensed printing and Parliament’s system of 
censorship that it represents will cause “the discouragement of all learning and the stop of 
truth, not only by disexercising and blunting our abilities in what we know already, but by 
hindering and cropping the discovery that might be yet further made both in religious and 
civil wisdom” (178). Fulton elaborates that “for [Milton] a prescribed set of beliefs does not 
yield knowledge of the good, but no knowledge at all” (87). Ultimately, by means of the 
control of licensed printing, the status quo would merely be reinforced and “English citizens 
would come to depend on their ministers instead of thinking for themselves” (Dobranski 
“Prose” 122).  
For Milton, rational choice and the acquisition of knowledge are inextricably linked. 
Because of this, it is impossible for an authority – be it church or Parliament – to determine 
and prescribe what is good and what is bad. Ultimately, true knowledge derives only from 
rational choice and “knowledge of the good cannot be prescribed by an external authority, 
since knowledge itself is not possible without the active volition of the knower” (Fulton 98, 
107). The notion that choice brings us to true knowledge becomes the foundation for Milton’s 
argument in Areopagitica. In other words, truth that is externally prescribed (i.e. controlled 
and given by an external power) can never instil true knowledge. Indeed, Milton states that “a 
man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so or 
the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the 
very truth he holds becomes his heresy” (200). Fulton further explains that “people 
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conforming to a prescribed body of knowledge may even speak the truth, but, not having 
arrived there by their own volition, are no closer to knowledge than they are in speaking 
falsely” (110). Ultimately, what Milton argues is that the English people should be left to 
make choices in these matters, and not forced to obey Parliament’s futile orders (Hoxby 222). 
Hoxby cleverly summarises that Milton is opposed to licensed printing because “it prevents 
future citizens from testing themselves in a wood of error and thus deprives the republic of 
virtuous adults who know what it means to exercise their reason, choice, and self-control” 
(236).  
 
1.3 Areopagitica: Gender Analysis 
Areopagitica is a strongly gendered piece of writing, especially in its use of language. It is 
written from an unmistakably male perspective and refers to men, and men alone, throughout. 
The first indication of this is found in the very beginning of Areopagitica: the pamphlet 
begins, for instance, with an epithet, taken from The Suppliants by Euripides, in which there 
is a reference to “freeborn men” (175). Throughout Areopagitica, Milton repeatedly makes 
use of intensely gendered language, mainly in the form of metaphors and similes that employ 
masculine language, for example battle metaphors. An example of such gendered language is 
found when Milton addresses the merits of a man who is exposed to temptation yet manages 
to abstain from it in comparison with someone who shies away from all temptation and 
becomes a recluse. Milton declares that “he that can apprehend and consider vice with all her 
baits and seeming pleasure, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is 
truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian” (186). Milton renders “vice” feminine in this 
passage: it is not simply “vice”, but “vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures”, which 
implies that the temptation previously mentioned is of the female kind and that, therefore, it 
is man versus female temptation specifically. Making use of the third personal pronoun “he”, 
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Milton illustrates once more that the search for truth and knowledge in Areopagitica is a 
specifically male endeavour – in this case mentioned explicitly adjacent to female temptation.  
Other examples of the way in which Milton uses masculine language in Areopagitica 
are the ways in which he describes the search for truth and knowledge. He specifically states 
that it is “one general and brotherly search after truth” and that we should rejoice rather than 
lament the “pious forwardness among men to reassume the ill-deputed care of their religion 
into their own hands again” (206). Milton describes the search for truth and knowledge as a 
specifically masculine endeavour and urges men to regain control over their religion and 
lives. Furthermore, Milton employs even more masculine language, claiming he envisions “a 
noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep” and that he sees the 
nation as “an eagle mewing” (207). The simile of the eagle suggests a fierce male image of 
strength and vitality. Milton’s repeated use of masculine language culminates near the end of 
Areopagitica. A plethora of martial terminology is used, which becomes especially evident 
from the following section, in which Milton states 
when a man hath been labouring the hardest labor in the deep mines of 
knowledge, hath furnished out his findings in all their equipage, drawn forth 
his reasons as it were a battle ranged, scattered and defeated all objections in 
his way, calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of 
wind and sun, if he please, only that he may try the matter by dint of 
argument; for his opponents then to skulk, to lay ambushments, to keep a 
narrow bridge of licensing where the challenger should pass, though it be 
valor enough in soldiership, is but weakness and cowardice in the wars of 
Truth. (209-10) 
Again, the search for truth and knowledge is seen as a male quest and a masculine endeavour: 
it is described as an epic undertaking.  
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The notion of the search for truth and knowledge among books as a specifically male 
quest is reinforced by Milton’s use of the Osiris myth. Arthur Coterell explains in The Oxford 
Dictionary of World Mythology that in this myth, Osiris’ brother “Seth seized the coffin 
containing the dead god [Osiris], cut the corpse into more than fourteen pieces, and scattered 
them throughout the land of Egypt. […] Isis sought her husband and with the assistance of 
Nut, the mother of Osiris, she resurrected the body”. Milton juxtaposes the truth with Osiris 
and likens the search for truth and knowledge to Isis’ search for her husband’s body. Similar 
to Osiris, the truth is mangled into a thousand pieces: rendering the truth feminine, Milton 
describes how the truth was “a perfect shape most glorious to look on”, but “a wicked race of 
deceivers” took “the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and 
scattered them to the four winds” (203). The truth, here presented as a female entity, is 
violently assaulted. The fact that this is a masculine endeavour performed on a female entity 
complicates the gender politics of Areopagitica. However, in Milton’s comparison of the 
search for truth and knowledge to Isis’ search for Osiris, he stresses that we must imitate Isis’ 
search for her lover Osiris. In other words, the brotherly, masculine search for truth and 
knowledge must imitate a woman’s search for her husband. The female gender is violently 
attacked and praised in the same metaphor, which further complicates Areopagitica’s gender 
politics. 
The gendered perspective from which Milton writes becomes especially evident in his 
discussion of the notion of temperance. Throughout Areopagitica, Milton stresses the 
importance of self-restraint. Emphasising that temperance is an inherent male virtue, 
entrusted to men by God, Milton states “how great a virtue is temperance, how much of 
moment through the whole life of man!” and that God “commits the managing so great a 
trust” to “every grown man” (186). The term “grown man” is especially important in this 
context. Throughout Areopagitica, there is mention of “grown men” who are able to discern 
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right from wrong, in contrast with child-like, more feminine men who are easily susceptible 
to temptation and vice and do not have the ability to make their own rational choices. Men 
are given the gift of reason: for a man to make his own educated decisions (“be his own 
chooser”) is manly, if not, he would be living under “a perpetual childhood of prescription” 
instead (186). By means of temperance, i.e. voluntary self-restraint, men should be able to 
make their own rational choices – to choose between good and bad, without the influence of 
external authorities like the church or Parliament. Even if such external influences are 
“interpreted charitably as a form of guardianship, it denies [men] the rights and 
responsibilities of men of riper years” (Hoxby 227).  
Milton describes men who depend on knowledge spoon-fed to them by Parliament as 
something other than men: because they are seemingly incapable of discerning the good from 
the bad (and use that to their own advantage), they are not truly men. To Milton, they are 
merely “as children and childish men who have not the art to qualify and prepare these 
working minerals” (189). Many of Milton’s arguments against licensed printing in 
Areopagitica can be traced back to the idea that true masculinity implies an ability to make a 
rational choice based on actively acquired knowledge. For Milton, the ability to make a 
rational choice based on the acquisition of knowledge is inextricably linked to the concept of 
masculinity. Indeed, to highlight this idea of masculinity, Milton uses yet another comparison 
between grown men and school boys, asking “what advantage is it to be a man over it is to be 
a boy at school, if we have only scaped the ferula to come under the fescue of an 
imprimatur?” (195). Again, the language and comparison in question is highly gendered. It is 
evident that to Milton, it is a sign of masculinity for men to look for knowledge themselves 
and make their own rational choices based on that knowledge.  
Furthermore, Milton actively identifies Parliament’s Licensing Order with 
emasculation and argues that real, masculine men do not need licensed printing issued by 
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Parliament: they are more than capable of making their own decisions. In fact, Milton goes as 
far as to suggest that masculine authority is threatened and undermined by licensed printing. 
He declares: 
And how can a man teach with authority, which is the life of teaching, how 
can he be a doctor in his book as he ought to be (or else had better be silent), 
whenas all he teaches, all he delivers, is but under the tuition, under the 
correction of his patriarchal licenser to blot or alter what precisely accords not 
with the hidebound humor which he calls his judgment? When every acute 
reader upon the first sight of a pedantic license will be ready with these like 
words to ding the book a quoit’s distance from him: “I hate a pupil teacher; I 
endure not an instructor that comes to me under the wardship of an overseeing 
fist. I know nothing of the licenser, but that I have his own hand here for his 
arrogance. Who shall warrant me his judgment?” (195-96) 
Men can no longer teach or write with authority because everything they write has to go 
through a licenser first. It is not simply unlicensed printing that is at stake here: the real issue 
is that masculine authority and masculine expression are being threatened and undermined by 
external authorities, in this case Parliament.  
Throughout Areopagitica, then, Milton makes use of gendered language and 
metaphors. Milton presents his readers with a specific ideal of masculinity. True men must 
not only be able to simply withstand (female) temptation, but must also be able to discern 
right from wrong and use this to their advantage and for their own personal development. 
Men who cannot do this are not men; they are simply referred to as children or childish men. 
The search for truth and knowledge is seen and described as a masculine quest; almost as an 
epic undertaking, with Milton employing terms such as “valor”, “ambushment”, 
“soldiership”, “wars of Truth”, “adversary” and “battle” (210). Licensed printing does not 
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simply threaten the freedom of expression; it specifically and most importantly threatens and 
undermines masculine authority and masculine expression. 
 
1.4 Areopagitica and Paradise Lost: A Comparison 
As seen in the previous chapter, one of the main notions that Milton advances in Areopagitica 
is the importance of the search for truth and knowledge. He describes this search as a type of 
personal development that is paramount to man’s whole being. One can only arrive at true 
knowledge by finding the truth oneself instead of solely relying on an externally prescribed 
set of opinions or beliefs, such as those of a licenser. In Areopagitica, Milton emphasises the 
need to have knowledge of both the good and the bad in order to prove one’s virtue: to know 
evil and to still choose good is what separates the hermit from the true, warfaring Christian. 
When one compares Areopagitica to Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost, however, 
some issues arise: Adam and Eve seem to have little to no actual knowledge of both the good 
and the bad and have to rely on knowledge and information from various external sources, 
such as God himself and the angel Raphael, but also Satan. Instead of acquiring knowledge 
themselves, Adam and Eve are instructed on different subjects on different occasions by these 
authorities. Various Milton scholars have commented on this supposed contradiction between 
Milton’s poetry and prose. In their introduction to the 2004 Oxford edition of Paradise Lost, 
Orgel and Goldberg declare that “Adam and Eve really are not in possession of enough 
information or experience to enable them a free choice” (21). To support this claim, Orgel 
and Goldberg base themselves on the notion of oppositeness. Flotats explains that the notion 
of oppositeness is part of “the need for reason understood as order” (183), a widely shared 
belief of the period that recurs in much of Milton’s writing. She elaborates that  
oppositeness […] is considered a necessary requirement for the distinction of 
each category. We could not postulate or explain “heat” if its contrary “cold” 
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did not exist, as we would not be able to distinguish its quality and effect. 
Therefore, the need of contrasts appears as an absolute condition and principle 
in terms of showing the veracity of a formulated hypothesis. If we expand the 
existence of contrasts to a moral level, we then find the need to postulate the 
existence of “evil”, which is the opposing quality of “goodness”. (183) 
Orgel and Goldberg use this idea as the foundation of their argument of Adam and Eve 
lacking the proper knowledge to make a free choice. They explain in further detail that  
we only know what we are, what our good is, when we know what the 
alternatives are. Experience is the chief form of knowledge in the poem (as it 
is throughout Milton) and the principal mode of experience is ‘try it and see’. 
This also means that we know what we have only through losing it; this is the 
essential means to knowledge. (23-24) 
The idea of experience being the chief form of knowledge is clearly reminiscent of what 
Milton stresses so much in Areopagitica: namely the importance of acquiring knowledge of 
both sides – i.e. opposites – to arrive at the truth yourself rather than relying on externally 
prescribed information. 
Orgel and Goldberg’s claim seems applicable enough to Paradise Lost: Adam and 
Eve are not always fully informed – and if they are, they are often incapable of actually 
comprehending what is said. Living in Eden, in a prelapsarian state, Adam and Eve have 
virtually no knowledge of concepts such as death, or pain and punishment. This becomes 
especially evident when Adam passes on God’s warning to keep away from the Tree of 
Knowledge to Eve:  
[…] he […] requires 
From us no other service than to keep 
This one, this easy charge, of all the trees 
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In Paradise that bear delicious fruit 
So various, not to taste that only tree 
Of knowledge, planted by the tree of life, 
So near grows death to life, what e’er death is, 
Some dreadful thing no doubt; for well thou know’st  
God hath pronounced it death to taste that tree, 
The only sign of our obedience left 
Among so many signs of power and rule 
Conferred upon us […]. (4.419-30) 
Death is clearly a foreign concept to Adam as he is unable to fully explain the consequences 
of eating from the Tree of Knowledge to Eve. Adam actively questions what death may be, 
“some dreadful thing no doubt”, but clearly, both Adam and Eve are unable to fathom the 
concept as “pre-lapsarian Adam and Eve do not yet know evil” (Murphy 70-71). Thomas 
Festa affirms this point, stating that “the threat of mortality can hardly be effective to beings 
who do not possess an ability to imagine death” (qtd. in Murphy 70-71). Indeed, Orgel and 
Goldberg ask: 
What does the threat of death mean in a world where no one has ever died? 
Death is a concept no one in the poem has any experience of: not Satan, not 
the angels, not even God – Death exists in the poem only as an allegorical 
figure on the outskirts of hell. The threat, therefore, can have meaning only for 
us, readers millennia later in a fallen world. (21) 
Moreover, at times, Adam and Eve prove to be oblivious of what they can and cannot do and 
with what attributes they were created. In Book 5, for instance, when Raphael reveals that 
God created man with free will, Adam exclaims “‘nor knew I not / To be both will and deed 
created free’” (548-49). It seems that Adam and Eve are not in possession of enough 
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knowledge or experience of the world around them, rendering them helpless when faced with 
the temptation of the Tree of Knowledge and Satan, unable to fathom the true consequences 
of their actions.  
While scholars such as Orgel and Goldberg and Thomas Festa support the claim that 
Adam and Eve are not in possession of enough knowledge or experience to make a free 
choice, I argue that Adam and Eve are in fact properly informed, and that not eating from the 
Tree of Knowledge is in fact an easy charge for them. What these readings seem to forget is 
that on multiple occasions in Paradise Lost, God presents Adam with a far more detailed 
description of the consequences of eating from the Tree of Knowledge. Elaborating on death, 
God warns Adam that if he eats from the tree, Adam will “inevitably […] die; / From that day 
mortal, and this happy state / Shalt lose, expelled from hence into a world / Of woe and 
sorrow’” (8.330-33). Murphy further explains that “though death and mortality are foreign 
concepts, God expands the definition to include the loss of beautiful Eden, a negative 
consequence that Adam can actually understand” (70-71). Adam is perfectly capable of 
understanding what it means to lose his and Eve’s happy state within Eden and, in that 
respect, he has more than enough knowledge at his disposal to enable him to make a free 
choice. 
Furthermore, Adam and Eve are duly warned: God makes an enormous effort and 
seems to go out of his way to warn Adam and Eve of the danger that surrounds them. In fact, 
he sends Raphael to converse with Adam, in order to warn him of what is coming: 
Go therefore, half this day as friend with friend 
Converse with Adam, in what bower or shade 
Thou find’st him from the heat of noon retired, 
To respite his day-labour with repast, 
Or with repose; and such discourse bring on, 
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As may advise him of his happy state, 
Happiness in his power left free to will, 
Left to his own free will, his will though free, 
Yet mutable; whence warn him to beware 
He swerve not too secure: tell him withal 
His danger, and from whom, what enemy 
Late fallen himself from heaven, is plotting now 
The fall of other from like state of bliss; 
By violence, no, for that shall be withstood, 
But by deceit and lies; this let him know, 
Lest wilfully transgressing he pretend 
Surprisal, unadmonished, unforewarned. (5.229-45) 
God expressly states that should anything happen to Adam and Eve, it is their own 
responsibility and a result of decisions made of their own free will. After all, God made man 
“just and right, / Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” (3.92-99). God claims no 
responsibility and, in fact, anticipates that Adam and Eve will find someone or something 
else to blame instead of looking for fault within themselves. The Argument to Book 5 of 
Paradise Lost further asserts this, as we learn that God sends Raphael to Adam “to render 
man inexcusable”. It becomes clear that while Adam and Eve may lack the experience, they 
certainly have more than enough knowledge at their disposal to enable them to make a free 
choice. 
Apart from the question of whether Adam and Eve are in possession enough 
knowledge and experience to make a free choice, Milton scholars comment on some 
instances in Paradise Lost in which Adam and Eve seem to be discouraged from seeking too 
much knowledge. This certainly seems out of line with Milton’s views put forward in 
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Areopagitica, as the search for truth and knowledge is described as a necessary endeavour in 
the life of man. Book 4 of Paradise Lost first presents us with a different, more adverse view 
of knowledge. The narrator comments on Adam and Eve, who are blissfully sleeping in their 
bower, saying: “‘Sleep on / Blest pair; and O yet happiest if ye seek / No happier state, and 
know to know no more” (773-75). Foreshadowing what is to come, i.e. the Fall, the narrator 
emphasises that Adam and Eve are happiest in their current state, and that this may easily be 
compromised if they long to have more knowledge. According to the narrator, Adam and Eve 
are most content as they are: they should refrain from seeking a happier state as this will 
inevitably lead to loss and harm. That there are certain boundaries to seeking knowledge 
becomes even more evident when the angel Raphael warns Adam of the potentially 
hazardous effects of wanting to have too much knowledge. Raphael explains: 
[…] knowledge is as food, and needs no less 
Her temperance over appetite, to know 
In measure what the mind may well contain, 
Oppresses else with surfeit, and soon turns 
Wisdom to folly, as nourishment to wind. (7.126-30) 
Temperance is key: all knowledge should be dealt with carefully, otherwise the wisdom 
acquired through knowledge may easily turn to folly, rendering it worthless.  
While Paradise Lost does indeed emphasise the limits of knowledge, it should be 
noted that knowledge in Paradise Lost as opposed to knowledge as described in Areopagitica 
are two very different concepts. Orgel and Goldberg argue that because “the one tree in Eden 
forbidden to humankind was the tree of knowledge; in the unfallen world, knowledge, the 
desire for learning and understanding, are evil” (26). However, in spite of what Orgel and 
Goldberg claim, not all knowledge is deemed evil in Paradise Lost: some areas of knowledge 
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are necessary to man, hence Raphael preaches temperance and not complete abstinence of 
acquiring knowledge. Schmiga further explains that 
if there are certain kinds or areas of knowledge that are natural and necessary 
for Adam and hence for his future descendants, then this is due to the fact that 
human beings need rational criteria in order to be able to judge and govern 
their desires. At the same time, the first dialogue between God and Adam 
serves to establish the boundaries of human knowledge through the prohibition 
to eat from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. In this way, Milton 
places the problem of knowledge within a delicate balance between legitimacy 
and illegitimacy from the very beginning of Adam’s (and by implication: 
humankind’s) existence. Even though knowledge is natural and necessary to 
man, as is his desire to know things concerning himself as well as heavenly 
things, there is one kind of forbidden knowledge which cannot be acquired 
without risking the original state of happiness. (7) 
Adam and Eve are warned against obtaining too much knowledge because too much 
knowledge in their case involves the risk of losing their original happy state in Eden. The 
search for truth and knowledge in the prelapsarian world of Eden is quite different from the 
search for truth and knowledge in a postlapsarian situation as described in Areopagitica. 
According to Milton, the truth on earth is no longer whole: it is fragmented and therefore it 
must be pieced together. This is precisely why the search for truth and knowledge is 
described as a brotherly endeavour: we can never achieve a whole, unfragmented truth if we 
do not zealously search for it, as described in Areopagitica. 
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1.5 Areopagitica and Paradise Lost: Gender Analysis 
Areopagitica and Paradise Lost are crucially different with regard to the portrayal of gender. 
As explained in the section that introduces the core argument of Areopagitica, the tract 
describes the search for truth and knowledge as an inherently male endeavour: it is a 
brotherly, masculine effort, and in all of Areopagitica, there is little to no mention of women. 
In contrast, in Paradise Lost it is Eve, remarkably enough, who functions as Milton’s voice in 
the poem, repeating the core arguments Milton makes in Areopagitica. By doing this, Eve 
undermines the gender politics of Areopagitica. In this section, I will analyse the separation 
scene in Book 9, in which Eve uses her free will and the core principles of Areopagitica to 
separate herself from Adam. 
Dobranski states that “Milton stages the scene preceding the fall of humankind by 
dramatizing one of Areopagitica’s core principles” (“Prose” 127). Indeed, in the separation 
scene, Eve uses one of the core principles of Areopagitica to convince Adam of the benefits 
of gardening by themselves for a while. Eve paraphrases Milton’s crucial point in 
Areopagitica that virtue must be tested or else, it is nothing but a blank virtue. As Milton in 
Areopagitica asserts that he “cannot praise a “fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and 
unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary” (187), so Eve echoes his words, 
asking Adam “and what is faith, love, virtue unassayed / Alone, without exterior help 
sustained?” (9.335-36). Replying to Adam’s statements about virtue by rephrasing Milton’s 
concept of the cloistered virtue, Eve shows that although she is a woman, she is more attuned 
to the arguments of Areopagitica than Adam is. Adam seems to be less well versed in 
Areopagitica’s core principles and seems afraid to be left on his own, and therefore wants 
Eve to remain by his side. Indeed, Adam himself attributes many virtuous qualities as 
described in Areopagitica to Eve: 
[…] so absolute she seems 
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And in her self complete, so well to know 
Her own, that what she wills to do or say, 
Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best; 
All higher knowledge in her presence falls 
Degraded, wisdom in discourse with her 
Loses discountenanced, and like folly shows; 
Authority and reason on her wait, 
As one intended first, not after made 
Occasionally; and to consummate all, 
Greatness of mind and nobleness their seat 
Build in her loveliest, and create an awe 
About her, as a guard angelic placed. (8.547-59) 
Using language reminiscent of Areopagitica, Adam stresses that Eve is closely attuned to the 
core principles of the tract. It is in the separation scene that Eve truly shows her 
argumentative vigour, proving that she is a formidable contender in the debate with Adam 
(Murphy 64). John Reichert affirms this in his book Milton’s Wisdom, arguing that Eve 
controls the debate from beginning to completion: “To a far greater extent than in her earlier 
speeches, [Eve] reveals in this dialogue a capacity for rigorous argument, a capacity which 
throws into sharp relief the almost total silence Milton imposes on her in the company of 
Raphael, Michael, and her maker” (qtd. in Murphy 64). In the separation scene, Eve 
undermines Areopagitica in its entirety: what is supposed to be a male endeavour is now 
acted out by a woman while Adam stands idly by.  
However, while Eve so confidently puts forward the arguments made by Milton in 
Areopagitica, she fails to remember that the search for truth and knowledge is a joint 
endeavour. As Eve argues that virtue must be tested without “exterior help” (i.e. Adam’s 
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help), she forgets the need for collaboration that Milton emphasises so much in Areopagitica. 
Dobranski further explains that  
the second part of Eve’s argument for working alone is faulty: Adam’s 
“exterior help” would not limit Eve’s virtue or compromise her free will. Eve 
does not sin until she eats the fruit, but here she fails to understand that 
arriving at the truth is both an individual endeavor and a collaborative process, 
and that she and Adam should “sustain” each other as they decide whether to 
work together or apart. (“Prose” 126-27) 
Throughout Areopagitica, Milton stresses the need for collaboration in order to acquire 
knowledge and piece together the fragmented truth. Indeed, he continues to emphasise that 
“where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, 
many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making” (206). Precisely 
because the truth in the postlapsarian world is fragmented, collaboration is so important: 
every single man holds another piece of truth, and without working together, we will never 
arrive at the complete and full truth. Collaboration in the search for truth and knowledge is 
key, and Milton stresses this in Paradise Lost in the figures of Adam and Eve.  
Eve demonstrates a further loss of her initial grasp of Areopagitica’s core principles 
in her exchange with Satan in Book 9 of Paradise Lost. In an attempt to seduce Eve, Satan 
paraphrases the core argument of Areopagitica, stating “knowledge of good and evil; / Of 
good, how just? of evil, if what is evil / Be real, why not known, since easier shunned?” 
(9.697-99). Satan, in fact, perverts the core argument of Areopagitica, but Eve fails to notice 
this. Radically changing Milton’s argument for his own gain, Satan claims it is better to 
actively know and commit evil in order to shun it all the more effectively later. Eve is easily 
deceived by Satan and fails to see how he twists the core argument of Areopagitica for his 
own advantage. It becomes evident that Eve slowly loses her initial grasp of Areopagitica’s 
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core principles, and although she seemed more attuned to the tract’s arguments in the 
separation scene, she is rather easily deceived. Indeed, we learn that Satan’s words “replete 
with guile / Into her heart too easy entrance won” (9.733-34).  
It becomes clear that both parties are at fault: Adam for distrusting Eve and trying to 
dissuade her from testing her own virtue, and Eve for forgetting that the search for truth and 
knowledge is a collaborative effort and being easily deceived by Satan’s corruption of 
Areopagitica’s core argument. However, it is Adam who refuses to accept responsibility and 
fully blames Eve for their predicament. This is another instance in Paradise Lost in which the 
matter of gender becomes evident once more. While both Adam and Eve have eaten from the 
Tree of Knowledge, Adam fully blames Eve. He outright accuses her of having ruined 
everything, and dismisses her, stating “out of my sight, thou serpent, that name best / Befits 
thee with him leagued, thyself as false / And hateful” (10.867-69). According to Adam, if 
Eve had listened to him and stayed by her husband’s side instead of wandering off alone, 
nothing would have happened: 
[…] But for thee 
I had persisted happy, had not thy pride 
And wand’ring vanity, when least was safe, 
Rejected my forewarning […]. (10.873-76) 
Instead of accepting his own responsibility, Adam shifts all blame onto Eve. This is in stark 
contrast with the theme of individual responsibility that is so fundamental to Areopagitica. 
The idea that true masculinity implies an ability to make a rational choice based on actively 
acquired knowledge is a recurrent idea in Areopagitica and one that Milton repeatedly 
stresses. The responsibility of such a rational choice lies with the individual itself, and not 
with others. By shifting all blame onto Eve, Adam shows once more that he does not fully 
grasp Areopagitica’s core principles. Indeed, Adam proves to be completely oblivious of his 
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own shortcomings as he fiercely accuses Eve, echoing the words of Areopagitica in his 
twisted logic:  
To trust thee from my side, imagined wise, 
Constant, mature, proof against all assaults, 
And understood not all was but a show 
Rather than solid virtue […]. (10.881-84) 
Adam attacks Eve for not being perfectly attuned to Areopagitica’s core principles, while it is 
his lack of taking individual responsibility that is truly divergent from the arguments put 
forward in Areopagitica.  
It becomes clear that Adam seeks no fault within himself, and requires Eve to admit to 
her mistakes in order to make their reunion and, ultimately, their redemption possible. It is 
only after Eve begs Adam to relent that he is finally moved to forgiveness and able to take up 
his individual responsibility. In her book Renaissance Suppliants: Poetry, Antiquity, 
Reconciliation, Leah Whittington explains that “instead of responding to Adam’s bitterness in 
kind, Eve breaks through the psychological impasse by acknowledging her guilt and begging 
Adam’s pardon” (179). Before this can occur, however, Adam needs Eve to humble herself 
before Adam as a suppliant. The idea of supplication has a long literary history that goes back 
as far as classical antiquity – an example is Homer’s Iliad, where King Priam humbles 
himself in front of Achilles, the killer of his son Hector, in order to retrieve his son’s body. 
The supplication scene in Paradise Lost is rather similar to the scene between King Priam 
and Achilles in The Iliad. It is not until Eve fully submits herself before Adam that he is able 
to forgive her and accept his own accountability. In fact, not only does Eve specifically state 
that she is Adam’s suppliant before he is capable of forgiveness; she also falls in front of 
Adam’s feet, humbling herself physically, clasping his knees: 
but Eve 
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Not so repulsed, with tears that ceased not flowing, 
And tresses all disordered, at his feet 
Fell humble, and embracing them, besought 
His peace, and thus proceeded in her plaint. 
Forsake me not thus, Adam, witness heaven 
What love sincere, and reverence in my heart 
I bear thee, and unweeting have offended, 
Unhappily deceived; thy suppliant 
I beg, and clasp thy knees; bereave me not, 
Whereon I live, thy gentle looks, thy aid, 
Thy counsel in this uttermost distress, 
My only strength and stay: forlorn of thee, 
Whither shall I betake me, where subsist? (10.909-21) 
Whittington explains that “the knee-clasp […] is a gesture common to suppliants 
across classical literature, but Milton seems to have in mind a Homeric version of the ritual. 
Eve echoes the formula as it appears across the Homeric poems, where suppliants announce 
themselves as begging and grasping the knees” (180). Eve surrenders completely to Adam 
and bows down in submissiveness to beg for his forgiveness. She expressly states that 
without Adam by her side, she is nothing. This is what Adam needs to hear and see: Eve’s 
submissiveness is what ultimately brings Adam to forgive her and take up his own 
responsibility. Indeed, “with the knee-clasp, Eve sets in motion the series of steps that give 
supplication its transformative and transitional power” (Whittington 183). Eventually, Eve 
wins Adam to her by means of her meekness and subjection: “moved by her humility, her 
dependence, and once again by her beauty, Adam responds to the need Eve has of him and 
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becomes once again her support, raising her from her helpless position” (Halkett 133-34). We 
learn that 
[Eve] ended weeping, and her lowly plight, 
Immovable till peace obtained from fault 
Acknowledged and deplored, in Adam wrought 
Commiseration; soon his hear relented  
Towards her, his life so late and sole delight, 
Now at his feet submissive in distress, 
Creature so fair his reconcilement seeking, 
His counsel whom she had displeased, his aid; 
As one disarmed, his anger all he lost, 
And thus with peaceful words upraised her soon. (10.937-45) 
It becomes evident that Adam is finally moved to forgiveness and accountability by Eve’s 
supplication. It is crucial that it is female supplication alone that makes their reunion and 
redemption possible. Although both parties are at fault in this situation, it is Eve rather than 
Adam who has to admit to her mistakes in order to make his forgiveness and their reunion 
possible. Adam needs to feel Eve’s submissiveness in order to accept his own responsibility: 
in other words, he needs to feel superior and cannot achieve this without Eve lowering 
herself. While I agree with Whittington that Eve’s supplication is transformative, it also 
entails subjection on Eve’s part. Ultimately, male forgiveness and accountability in Paradise 
Lost cannot be achieved without female subjection, submissiveness and supplication, which 
is in stark contrast with the intertwined notions of masculinity and individual responsibility of 
Areopagitica. Indeed, it should be noted that Eve’s supplication is required for both Adam 
and Eve to ask God’s forgiveness, and supplicate to the Son of God. We learn that 
they forthwith to the place 
Lachhab 37 
 
Repairing where he judged them prostrate fell 
Before him reverent, and both confessed 
Humbly their faults, and pardon begged, with tears 
Watering the ground, and with their sighs the air 
Frequenting, sent from hearts contrite, in sign 
Of sorrow unfeigned, and humiliation meek. (10.1098-1104) 
While it initially seems as if Eve undermines Areopagitica as a whole in the 
separation scene, being more well versed in its core principles than Adam, the male authority 
of Areopagitica returns with Adam’s response to Eve’s supplication. Adam is finally driven 
to accept individual responsibility, so fundamental to Areopagitica, but Milton 
simultaneously employs him to bring back the male authority of Areopagitica in Paradise 
Lost. Adam responds to Eve’s supplication, stating 
If prayers 
Could alter high decrees, I to that place 
Would speed before thee, and be louder heard, 
That on my head all might be visited, 
Thy frailty and infirmer sex forgiven, 
To me committed and by me exposed. (10.952-57)  
Adam accepts his own responsibility in eating from the Tree of Knowledge, admitting his 
fault lies in not protecting Eve, the “infirmer sex”, more. In Book 4 of Paradise Lost during 
the separation scene, Eve seems to be the one who is more attuned to the core principles of 
Areopagitica. This, however, is undermined once more, as Adam is now shown to be Eve’s 
protector with Eve being branded as part of the weaker sex. Adam’s response to Eve’s 
supplication suggests that women pose too much of a risk and must be guarded and protected. 
Paradise Lost initially opens up and seems to challenge the gender politics of Areopagitica 
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with Eve functioning as the mouthpiece for the tract’s core arguments, but eventually Milton 
undermines this once more through Adam, who suggests women are the weaker sex and must 
therefore be closely watched and protected.  
 
1.6 Areopagitica and Paradise Lost: Conclusion 
It is evident that the relationship between Milton’s Areopagitica and Paradise Lost is 
complicated and multiplex. On the one hand, Paradise Lost may be seen as a confirmation of 
the views put forward in Areopagitica, for instance with regard to key Miltonic concepts such 
as knowledge and experience. Although it initially seems as if Adam and Eve are not in 
possession of enough information or experience to make a free choice, it soon becomes 
apparent that the duo is, in fact, amply and properly informed by God and others on multiple 
occasions. Furthermore, while Paradise Lost does indeed emphasise that there are certain 
limits and boundaries to seeking knowledge, this is only because knowledge in Paradise Lost 
as opposed to knowledge as described in Areopagitica are two very different concepts. Adam 
and Eve are warned against seeking too much knowledge because in their case, seeking too 
much knowledge could mean the loss of their original state in Eden. Indeed, the search for 
truth and knowledge in the prelapsarian world of Eden is quite different from the search for 
truth and knowledge in a postlapsarian situation as described in Areopagitica. Evidently, the 
concepts of knowledge and experience as put forward in Areopagitica are confirmed by 
Milton in Paradise Lost.  
However, when considering other issues, for instance gender, it becomes clear that the 
relationship between Areopagitica and Paradise Lost is more complex and ambiguous. The 
gender politics of Areopagitica are rather straightforward: there is little to no mention of 
women in the tract, and the search for truth and knowledge is described as an inherently male 
endeavour which should be a brotherly, masculine effort. In Paradise Lost, however, Milton 
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employs Eve as his mouthpiece, having her repeat the core arguments of Areopagitica. Eve 
seems to undermine the gender politics of Areopagitica because she is much more attuned to 
Areopagitica’s core principles than Adam is. Crucially, what should be a male endeavour is 
now acted out by Eve while Adam simply looks on. Although Eve seems to undermine the 
gender politics of Areopagitica in Paradise Lost, it becomes clear that she does not fully 
grasp the core principles of the tract, as she forgets the need for collaboration in the search for 
knowledge and truth and is rather easily deceived when confronted by Satan in Book 9 of 
Paradise Lost. Indeed, the male authority of Areopagitica fully returns in Paradise Lost when 
Adam shifts all responsibility for the Fall on Eve, and requires her to supplicate before he is 
able to take up his individual responsibility. It becomes clear that male forgiveness and 
accountability in Paradise Lost cannot be achieved without female subjection, 
submissiveness and supplication, which is in stark contrast with the intertwined notions of 
masculinity and individual responsibility of Areopagitica. While it initially seems as if Eve 
undermines Areopagitica as a whole in the separation scene, being more well versed in its 
core principles than Adam, the male authority of Areopagitica returns with Adam’s response 
to Eve’s supplication as he distinctly labels Eve’s gender inferior and weak. While Paradise 
Lost initially opens up and seems to challenge the gender politics of Areopagitica with Eve 
functioning as the mouthpiece for the tract’s core arguments, eventually Milton undermines 
this once more through Adam, who suggests women are the weaker sex and must therefore be 
closely watched and protected. It becomes clear that the relationship between Areopagitica 
and Paradise Lost is an ambivalent one, as Paradise Lost re-examines rather than confirms 
the gender issues of Areopagitica.   
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Chapter 2: The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce 
2.1 The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: Context 
Milton anonymously published the first edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce on 
1 August 1643. Six months later, on 2 February 1644, Milton published another edition of the 
tract which had been greatly expanded and revised, after which two further editions appeared 
in 1645. In total, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce appeared four times (Dobranski 
“Prose” 109, Espejo 47). In his tract, Milton advocates divorce on other grounds than 
adultery alone, which was far ahead of his time (Kerrigan et al. 101). Milton had personal 
reasons to write The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, as his first wife, 16-year-old Mary 
Powell, deserted him and lived with her parents for three years of their marriage (Dobranski 
“Prose” 108). Although Milton never divorced Mary Powell (or either of his two wives who 
followed), it is possible that his personal experiences prompted him to write about divorce 
(Low 179).  
When The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce appeared in 1643, the indissolubility of 
marriage was still part of canon law. Indeed, church doctrine prescribed that a valid marriage 
could only be dissolved by the death of either one of the spouses. Dobranski further explains 
that “if a spouse committed adultery or any other offense that made cohabitation undesirable, 
the church allowed the innocent spouse the right to “separation from bed and board” (in 
Latin, a mensa et thoro), but in these cases the couple still remained legally married and were 
expected to remain faithful to each other” (“Prose” 105). Full divorce and remarriage was not 
only prohibited by the church; it was unheard of. However, Milton was not the only writer 
who advocated divorce: some writers before him had defended divorce too, most notably 
William Tyndale, who “supported divorce for desertion and adultery” (Dobranski “Prose” 
107). Indeed, Dobranski explains that Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce was part 
of a growing debate about marriage and divorce:  
Lachhab 41 
 
[Milton’s] four pamphlets defending divorce can be understood in the context 
of a broader cultural debate about the indissolubility of marriage. Various 
English writers published their positions on divorce – both for and against – 
during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, and even earlier […] a 
bill for the reformation of ecclesiastical law had come before Parliament and 
included a proposal to allow divorce with the right to remarry. (“Prose” 104) 
While Milton was certainly not the only English writer to defend divorce, he 
nevertheless was “far ahead of his time in calling for divorce on grounds of what we would 
now call incompatibility. To his bewildered and scandalized contemporaries, Milton seemed 
rather to be arguing for divorce on the basis of a mere personal whim” (Low 179). Indeed, 
with his emphasis on the importance of compatibility within marriage, Milton “developed an 
argument that reached […] beyond the terms advocated by other contemporary writers” 
(Dobranski “Prose” 108). Dobranski goes on to explain that  
even with the new social emphasis, the most liberal arguments for divorce in 
seventeenth-century England continued to focus on cases of desertion and 
adultery. In other words, no one before Milton exceeded the already widely 
accepted position taken by Continental Protestants during the preceding 
century. (“Prose” 108).  
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is significant because Milton broadens the valid 
reasons for divorce to include more than adultery and desertion alone: not only does he 
advocate divorce on the grounds of emotional incompatibility, Milton also defends the rights 
of both spouses to remarry as opposed to the victim of an unfaithful spouse alone, and argues 
“that the right to dissolve a marriage should be transferred from ecclesiastical or civil courts 
and rest solely with the spouses themselves” (Dobranski “Prose” 108).  
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2.2 The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: Core Argument 
In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton advocates divorce on the grounds of 
emotional incompatibility. To understand this core argument of the tract, we must look at 
Milton’s definition of marriage first. Milton bases his definition of marriage on the Bible, and 
in particular on Genesis 2:18, in which God announces his intentions in instituting marriage: 
“It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him” (Kerrigan et 
al. 102). In Genesis 2:18, God promises man a “meet help against loneliness” (116), from 
which Milton deduces that God “expressly institutes marriage as a cure for the “evil of 
solitary life”” (Dobranski “Prose” 108-09). As Diane Purkiss explains, “the telos of marriage 
is not procreation or the prevention of sexual sin, but “the apt and cheerful conversation of 
man with woman, to comfort and refresh him against the evils of solitary life”” (2). To 
Milton, the marriage relationship is the end itself rather than a means to a further end, as he 
states that marriage’s “best and sweetest purposes” and its “chief ends” are “the helps and 
comforts of domestic life” (Halkett 13, 119).  Throughout The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce, Milton stresses the importance of the notion of “fitness”: the fulfilling of love “by 
uniting another body, but not without a fit soul, to [man] in the cheerful society of wedlock” 
(122). To Milton, marriage is a way of remedying each other’s loneliness: it is intended to be 
the “ordinance of our solace and contentment” (110). He views marriage as a primarily 
intellectual and emotional relationship between two spouses in a “meet and happy 
conversation” (119).   
Milton uses his view of marriage to advocate divorce on the grounds of emotional 
incompatibility. Because a bad marriage between incompatible minds and souls is a marriage 
that does not provide the “solace and delight” that it should, such a marriage must be worse 
than loneliness, as “the continual sight of [a spouse’s] deluded thoughts without cure, must 
needs be […] a daily trouble and pain of loss” (120, Dobranski “Prose” 109). Indeed, Milton 
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claims that “a marriage that does not meet its God-given purpose is not a valid marriage. He 
concludes that divorce should therefore be allowed because, according to God’s law, 
incompatible couples are not actually married” (Dobranski “Prose” 109). It becomes evident 
that Milton places a great deal of emphasis on the importance of emotional compatibility, or 
“fitness”, within marriage. Milton also bases himself on Moses’ Law as dictated in 
Deuteronomy 24.1-2, in which Moses states that a man is allowed to divorce his wife should 
“she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her” (Kerrigan et 
al. 102). Unfitness of mind (i.e. emotional incompatibility) is a spiritual condition which is 
equivalent to “some uncleanness” as dictated in Moses’ Law (Halkett 51). Halkett explains 
that “as a spiritual condition, it has physical effects: it not only induces hatred and prevents 
the possibility of love or concord, but also creates physical displeasure, dissolves the union of 
bodies as well as minds, and reduces matrimony to the level of bestial intercourse” (51).  
Milton places a lot more emphasis on the mind as opposed to the body: according to 
him, two incompatible minds together should be legitimate grounds enough for divorce. It is 
hypocritical for canon law to allow divorce based on bodily incompatibility, “but nothing for 
the wrongs and grievances of the mind” (120). Milton argues that “indisposition, unfitness or 
contrariety of mind” (118) are much worse than adultery and are all valid reasons for divorce 
as they hinder the peace of both spouses. “The unfitness of an unconjugal mind” (118) is 
what ultimately hinders the primary goal of marriage. A marriage of unequal, incompatible 
minds is an unhappy marriage: indeed, to Milton, it is similar to, or even worse than, an 
“effect of tyranny on the commonwealth”; it is a “household unhappiness on the family” 
(110). Referring to an unhappy marriage of incompatible minds as an “unworthy bondage” 
(110), Milton compares such a marriage to an ill government, which a people have every 
right to revolt against. Likewise, men should be able to break free from the bonds of marriage 
by means of divorce.  
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2.3 The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: Gender Analysis 
Naturally, due to its topic, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is an intensely gendered 
work. Milton’s view of marriage as presented in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is 
not only important for an understanding of the core argument of the tract, it is also essential 
for an understanding of its gender politics. Because God’s intention in creating marriage is to 
supply man specifically with a help meet (“It is not good that man should be alone; I will 
make him an help meet for him” (Kerrigan et al. 102)), there are certain implications for the 
hierarchy in marriage: while both men and women are equal before God, their relationship is 
not founded on equal virtue and “their contract rests upon the husband’s superior place” 
(Halkett 47, Olmsted 189-90, 201). Dobranski also asserts this, stating that in The Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce, Milton “accepts a hierarchy of gender in which women are 
inferior to men” (“Prose” 115). Though it is comprised of unequal partners, Milton considers 
the marriage relationship “a harmony of souls and wills” (Halkett 57), substituting “the idea 
of equality as fitness in place of the equality as parity” (Olmsted 189-90). While Milton 
seems to advocate “an ideal of nearly egalitarian, companionate marriage” (Kerrigan et al. 
102), he repeatedly insists on the superior position of man, stating that man is “the head of 
the other sex which was made for him” (163).  
Claiming that women should be “a solace”; “a fit help”; “a consort […] through the 
whole life of a man” (122), Milton stresses that the primary goal of marriage is “the apt and 
cheerful conversation of man with woman, to comfort and refresh him against the evil of 
solitary life” (114). It becomes evident that there is a clear division of labour within marriage 
for both men and women: marriage is instituted as a solace for man, while “the wife helps 
restore to her husband by her society a less burdensome habit of thought”; according to 
Milton, “she should be an intimate and speaking help, a ready and reviving associate in 
marriage” (Halkett 60). Through marriage, women should render their husbands’ lives 
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comfortable and delightful, while men should function as authority figures within marriage 
and be women’s guides and protectors. The assertion of male superiority within marriage is 
clearly present in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, as Milton repeatedly insists on the 
natural hierarchy within marriage with the male as the head and the female as his inferior 
(Kerrigan et al. 102, 103). Indeed, Milton once again reminds his audience of God’s 
intentions in creating marriage, and for whom it was initially and specifically created, stating 
“what thing ever was more made for man alone […] than marriage?” (136). Stressing 
women’s position within marriage as help meets and men’s inferiors, Milton declares that 
those who refuse to believe “that woman was created for man and not man for woman” are 
“ignorant” (149).  
The gender politics of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce become especially 
evident in the depiction of women as the party at fault within marriage. With the subtitle of 
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, “restored to the good of both sexes” (113), Milton 
implies that the tract is beneficial to both men and women. Women, however, are consistently 
portrayed as the party at fault within marriage. Chaplin affirms this claim, stating that 
Milton’s  
descriptions of failed matches consistently hold the wife guilty. She is the one 
who threatens to “disinable him in the whole service of God through the 
disturbance of her unhelpful and unfit society”. It is always the innocent 
husband who seems to “find himself bound fast… to an image of earth and 
fleam”. In effect, Milton protects himself by displacing all responsibility onto 
the wife […]. (271) 
Indeed, Milton repeatedly lashes out at women throughout The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce: men are consistently depicted as the blameless party within marriage, with the 
notion of unfitness, for instance, applied to women only, and never to men (Kerrigan et al. 
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102). Halkett explains that “the condition of unfitness […] is by no means mutual; as Milton 
defines the term, it is clear that he intends it to apply to the wife alone” (51).   
It becomes increasingly clear that Milton places all responsibility of an unhappy 
marriage onto the wife: in response to the objection that marriage should be seriously 
considered beforehand to prevent such unhappy marriages, – and ultimately, divorce – Milton 
explains that  
for all the wariness can be used, it may yet befall a discreet man to be 
mistaken in his choice, and we have plenty of examples. The soberest and best 
governed men are least practiced in these affairs; and who knows not that the 
bashful muteness of a virgin may of-times hide all the unliveliness and natural 
sloth which is really unfit for conversation. (121) 
In this passage, Milton paints an intensely gendered picture of marriage, in which good and 
virtuous men are tricked into marriage by women who may seem virtuous and shy; virgin-
like even, but really, their beautiful outward appearance actually hides their “unliveliness” 
and “natural sloth”. Again, Milton stresses the faultlessness of men in all matters of marriage: 
it is women who are to blame, as they lure men into marriage but are later revealed to be 
extremely unfit for the ultimate goal of marriage: to render man’s life easy and delightful. 
Indeed, Milton emphasises that it is perfectly natural for men to be mistaken in their choice of 
marriage partner, as women are inherently deceitful and innocent men who “have spent their 
youth chastely” are “in some things not so quick-sighted” (121). Kerrigan et al. further 
explain that “The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is punctuated by third-person 
descriptions of the virtuous young man who, like Milton, has delayed sexual gratification 
only to be mistaken in his choice of a mate and robbed of divinely sanctioned corporeal and 
spiritual intimacy” (103). It becomes evident that Milton presents a deeply gender-
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hierarchical view of marriage in which good men are ensnared in unhappy marriages by 
deceitful women.  
The problematic view of women as deceitful is sustained and even heightened 
throughout The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. Indeed, men in unhappy marriages are 
consistently alluded to using language that refers to being forced: they are “bound” (124), in 
“bondage” (125), “bound fast to an uncomplying discord of nature” (124), and forced to 
“grind in the mill of an undelighted and servile copulation” (127). An unhappy marriage is 
not simply a form of bondage to men, but becomes “a snare of misery” (128), into which men 
are forced and lured “by a deceitful bait” (128), i.e. a woman. Women are now compared to 
and depicted as idolatresses who lead men away from God by their treacherous company. 
Milton states “and what difference is there whether she pervert him to superstition by her 
enticing sorcery or disenable him in the whole service of God through the disturbance of her 
unhelpful and unfit society, and so drive him at last through murmuring and despair to 
atheism?” (128). Apparently, women’s unfit company will ultimately lead men to atheism: 
Milton even goes as far as to suggest that being in an unfit marriage tarnishes men’s duty of 
serving God (127). Whether it is willingly or unwillingly, eventually the company of an unfit 
wife will lead men away from God, and in that case, the wife “ought to be disbanded” (128). 
Milton increasingly refers to women as dead weight, a burden, to be discarded as one 
pleases. This reaches its height in the passage in which Milton invokes Mezentius, “the 
mythical Etruscan despot reported in Virgil’s Aeneid and other sources to have poisoned his 
victims by chaining them in close embrace with rotting corpses” (Keymer). Milton uses the 
Mezentius myth to liken a marriage of incompatible minds and souls to a living soul that is 
bound to a dead corpse. He explains that a legitimate marriage “can never be where no 
correspondence is of the mind; nay instead of being one flesh, they will be rather two 
carcasses chained unnaturally together; or as it may happen, a living soul bound to a dead 
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corpse, a punishment too like that inflicted by the tyrant Mezentius” (151). It becomes 
evident that what is meant by “a living soul” is a man, and what is meant by “a dead corpse” 
is a woman. Throughout The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, then, women are portrayed 
as the party at fault, not only in marriage, but in life: Milton places all responsibility on 
women and continuously emphasises the faultlessness and infallibility of men.  
Furthermore, similar to the search for truth and knowledge in Areopagitica, divorce in 
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is described as an inherently male notion and a 
masculine endeavour. Divorce itself is referred to as an inherently masculine concept: to 
divorce in order to end an unhappy marriage of incompatible minds is the manly thing to do, 
as Milton explains: “the aggrieved person (i.e. the husband) shall do more manly, to be 
extraordinary and singular in claiming the due right whereof he is frustrated, than to piece up 
his lost contentment” (120). Marriage itself is rendered feminine, and referred to in negative 
terms: an unhappy marriage of incompatible minds is described as a “tyranness or a goddess 
over the enfranchised life and soul of man” (133). It is not only men’s happiness that is at 
stake in an unfit marriage, but also men’s lives and souls, both of which are threatened by 
women. Indeed, it becomes clear that true masculinity is what truly is at stake in marriage.  
Arguing that canon law is hypocritical in allowing divorce based on bodily 
incompatibility, “but nothing for the wrongs and grievances of the mind” (120), Milton states 
that procreation within marriage is far less important than the mind and its needs. To Milton, 
to prioritise the body and its needs is “ignominious to the state of marriage [and] 
dishonourable to the undervalued soul of man” (121). Real men value the mind and soul more 
than the body, and that these aspects are not deemed as important as the body and its needs is 
not merely hypocritical, but dishonourable to these men. Indeed, Milton differentiates 
between the “heroically virtuous” and “the common lump of men”, the former being able to 
withstand temptation, even within an unhappy, unfit marriage, and the latter – which consists 
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of most men – looking elsewhere, “it being above their strength to endure the lonely estate, 
which while they shunned they are fallen into” (124). To Milton, men are blameless and are, 
in fact, heroic if they somehow are still able to withstand temptation, as it is only natural for 
men to wish to escape their “bondage” (125) of an unhappy marriage of incompatible minds. 
Throughout The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, then, Milton presents men as an 
undervalued, unappreciated species, faultless yet threatened in their masculinity by women.  
 
2.4 The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce and Paradise Lost: A Comparison 
Milton’s Paradise Lost and The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce are closely connected, as 
many of the ideas about marriage that Milton advances in The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce are also explored in Paradise Lost. Indeed, many Milton scholars argue that Milton’s 
marriage ideal as presented in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is reflected in Adam 
and Eve’s relationship in Paradise Lost. This claim seems applicable enough, as there are 
many passages in Paradise Lost that are indeed reminiscent of Milton’s arguments in The 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. In his extensive study of Paradise Lost and Milton’s 
divorce tracts, Milton and the Idea of Matrimony, John Halkett explains that “the language 
and the conceptions of the poem […] correspond in many […] ways to those of the divorce 
tracts” (116). Indeed, Halkett argues that 
Milton’s position in the tracts depends on an essential distinction between the 
rights of man and woman, based on the differences in their natural hierarchical 
level. This distinction is also maintained in Paradise Lost, in the critical and 
tragic disparity between the intellects of Adam and Eve, and in capacities for 
household prudence, mutual aid, authority, obedience, and love. (140) 
While scholars such as Halkett and Fredson Bowers (most notably in his article “Adam, Eve, 
and the Fall in Paradise Lost”) view Paradise Lost as a confirmation of the gender issues of 
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The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, I argue that the relationship between Milton’s poem 
and the divorce tracts is more complex and ambiguous, as Paradise Lost questions and re-
examines rather than confirms the gender issues of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. 
Furthermore, I argue that Adam and Eve’s relationship in Paradise Lost is ever evolving, and 
that the reworking of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce in Paradise Lost is as dynamic 
as the relationship between the divorce tracts and the poem. In the following paragraphs I will 
present the reader with various examples of the ways in which The Doctrine and Discipline 
of Divorce and Paradise Lost are linked and how ambiguous the relationship between the 
poem and the divorce tracts is. 
The first ambiguous link between Paradise Lost and The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce concerns the poem’s gender politics: more specifically, the portrayal of Eve and the 
female gender in general, which initially seems to be in total compliance with the divorce 
tracts. This becomes evident from the portrayal of Sin in Book 2 of Paradise Lost. In a rather 
gruesome description, we learn that Sin 
seemed woman to the waist, and fair, 
But ended foul in many a scaly fold 
Voluminous and vast, a serpent armed 
With mortal sting: about her middle round 
A cry of hell hounds never ceasing barked 
With wide Cerberian mouths full loud, and rung 
A hideous peal: yet, when they list, would creep, 
If aught disturbed their noise, into her womb, 
And kennel there, yet there still barked and howled, 
Within unseen. (2.650-59)  
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Susan Miller explains that the “portrayal of Sin as a serpentine female […] draws on a motif 
common in antifeminist accounts, and it creates a context for viewing women that can never 
be fully forgotten as one enters into Eden in Book 4” (“Gender” 153). Indeed, it is remarkable 
that Sin should be described as part woman, part serpent; one who seems “fair”, but ends 
“foul”. This comparison is reminiscent of Milton’s argument in The Doctrine and Discipline 
of Divorce, in which he warns men of “the bashful muteness of a virgin” that “may of-times 
hide all the unliveliness and natural sloth which is really unfit for conversation” (121). 
Milton’s strongly gendered picture of marriage, in which good and virtuous men are tricked 
by women who may seem virtuous and shy, but actually hide their “unliveliness” and 
“natural sloth” with their beautiful outward appearance, is very similar to the portrayal of Sin. 
Like these deceitful women, Sin may seem fair and lovely, but is, in fact, “a serpent armed / 
With mortal sting” (2.652-52). It is striking that the very first portrayal of a female being in 
Paradise Lost should be that of Sin, something which, I agree with Susan Miller, creates a 
rather negative and biased context for viewing Eve once she appears in the poem. 
When Eve finally appears in Book 4 of Paradise Lost, the hideous image of Sin is still 
fresh in the reader’s mind. Additionally, scholars argue that throughout the poem, Eve is 
accompanied by “fallen images” (Hamilton qtd. in Erickson 163), which only serves to 
amplify the biased context for viewing Eve and women in general. The fallen images that 
accompany Eve are seen in the description of both Adam and Eve in Book 4 of Paradise 
Lost, where we learn that Eve 
as a veil down to the slender waist 
Her unadorned golden tresses wore 
Dishevelled, but in wanton ringlets waved 
As the vine curls her tendrils, which implied 
Subjection, but required with gentle sway, 
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And by her yielded, by him best received, 
Yielded with coy submission, modest pride, 
And sweet reluctant amorous delay. (4.304-311) 
Not only is Eve’s hair described as “dishevelled”, the adjective “wanton” is quite suggestive: 
Hamilton explains that “the epithet “wanton”, while retaining its primary meaning of 
disordered luxuriance, inevitably introduces more disturbing connotations” (qtd. in Erickson 
163). Indeed, Milton repeatedly accompanies Eve’s descriptions with suggestive and rather 
ambiguous phrases, such as “darts of desire” (8.62), “peculiar graces” (5.15), “female charm” 
(9.999), “with tresses discomposed” (5.10), “not obtrusive” (8.504) and “pure of sinful 
thought” (8.506). Furthermore, Erickson explains that Eve is “often associated with 
destructive women who use their “feminine charm” to manipulate men – Pandora, Hera, 
Helen, Venus, Diana, Proserpina, and most importantly, Circe, who represented, particularly 
in Milton’s time, a symbol of spiritual degradation” (163). It becomes evident that Eve’s 
portrayal in Paradise Lost is ambiguous. Eve, too, may be linked to Milton’s argument in The 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce of “the bashful muteness of a virgin” that “may of-times 
hide all the unliveliness and natural sloth which is really unfit for conversation” (121): Eve 
may seem lovely and created perfectly, but Milton himself warns us of the deceitful nature of 
women in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.  
Although Eve is indeed strongly associated with the Fall throughout Paradise Lost, 
Eve’s entire image of sinful seductress is undermined in Book 11 of the poem, which truly 
shows the ambiguous nature of Paradise Lost and how it questions rather than simply 
confirms the gender issues of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. When Adam is shown 
the long history of men’s sins and crimes, he exclaims “but still I see the tenor of man’s woe / 
Holds on the same, from woman to begin” (11.632-33). Similar to his response immediately 
after the Fall, Adam once more places all responsibility on Eve, and on women in general. 
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The archangel Michael sternly rebukes him, explaining that “from man’s effeminate 
slackness it begins, / […] who should better hold his place / By wisdom, and superior gifts 
received” (11.632-36). The term “effeminate slackness” suggests that when Adam – or, men 
in general – abandons his masculine duties, the consequences are great. This, then, implies 
that men are the responsible party. Although most of Paradise Lost seems to implicate Eve in 
the Fall, the penultimate book of the poem undermines this portrayal and changes the initial 
representation of women. The notion of women being the party at fault in marriage (with men 
being wholly blameless) that is advanced in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is 
undermined in Paradise Lost, as Milton clearly states that the “effeminate slackness” of men 
is the root of all problems in marriage. It becomes evident that Paradise Lost complicates 
much of the argument put forward in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, and that the 
relationship between the poem and the divorce tracts is of an ambiguous nature.  
Another indicator of the ambiguity between Paradise Lost and The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce may be found in the union of Adam and Eve. In many ways, their 
union is in perfect accordance with Milton’s marriage ideal as proposed in the divorce tracts, 
but their relationship is just as often portrayed less unequivocally. One of the ways in which 
Milton’s views on marriage are echoed in Paradise Lost becomes evident from Book 8 of the 
poem, in which Adam asks God for a companion. Adam finds his solitude intolerable and 
asks: “in solitude / What happiness, who can enjoy alone, / Or all enjoying, what contentment 
find?” (8.364-66). Echoing a number of key concepts from The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce, Adam draws on the notion of marital fitness and companionship: 
Among unequals what society 
Can sort, what harmony or true delight?  
Which must be mutual, in proportion due 
Given and received; but in disparity 
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The one intense, the other still remiss 
Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove 
Tedious alike: of fellowship I speak 
Such as I seek, fit to participate 
All rational delight […]. (8.383-91) 
Adam’s speech is reminiscent of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, as he emphasises 
his need for not simply any companion, but an equal one in terms of emotional compatibility. 
He recognises the limitations of companionship with lower creatures and yearns for mutual 
and fit fellowship. God’s response to Adam’s request for a companion also draws on The 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, as it includes a notable emphasis on words denoting 
likeness, fitness and meetness: “What next I bring shall please thee, be assured, / Thy 
likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, / Thy wish exactly to thy heart’s desire” (8.449-51). 
Adopting terms such as “harmony”, “fellowship”, “rational delight”, “likeness”, “fit” and 
“help”, both Adam and God echo Milton’s views of marriage as stated in The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce. Halkett explains that “words such as these express the perfection of the 
union and consonance of Adam and Eve; they grow out of the long tradition that their 
marriage was the perfect pattern and archetype of all marriages” (116). Indeed, the account of 
Eve’s creation that follows only further echoes Milton’s marriage ideal as put forward in his 
divorce tracts, with words and phrases such as “collateral love”, “dearest amity” and “social 
communication” (8.426, 429, 433). These words and phrases specifically identify what Adam 
seeks in a companion (and ultimately in marriage), “just as they are precisely the essence of 
marriage according to Milton’s divorce tracts” (Halkett 116).  
While Adam’s request for a companion may be read as a confirmation of the core 
arguments of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Paradise Lost’s description of Adam 
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and Eve in Book 4 truly reveals the ambivalent relationship between the poem and the 
divorce tracts.  Adam and Eve are initially described as two majestic beings: they are 
Living creatures new to sight and strange: 
Two of far nobler shape erect and tall, 
Godlike erect, with native honour clad 
In naked majesty seemed lords of all, 
And worthy seemed, for in their looks divine 
The image of their glorious maker shone, 
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure. (4.287-94) 
Milton portrays Adam and Eve as equal beings, in both of whom “the image of their glorious 
maker” is reflected. They are both described as “godlike”, “divine”, noble and “erect”, and 
their relationship seems to be founded on equality. However, mere moments later, the 
passage shifts: Susan Miller explains that although the description initially offers “an account 
of Adam and Eve as co-equal by granting them both “naked majesty” such that they “seemed 
lords of all””, Milton goes on to assert that “true authority” resides “in men” (“Gender” 154). 
Indeed, what follows is a “gender specific differentiation of Adam and Eve that reflects the 
creation narrative in Genesis 2 and some of its more traditional implications” (Miller 
“Gender” 154). Adam and Eve’s initial description as equal beings develops into a clear 
assertion of men’s superior position within marriage and life in general.  
It is remarkable that Adam and Eve’s initial portrait as equal, majestic beings should 
be followed by such an elaborate description of the hierarchical differences between men and 
women. We learn that Adam and Eve are  
Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed;  
For contemplation he and valour formed, 
For softness she and sweet attractive grace, 
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He for God only, she for God in him: 
His fair large front and eye sublime declared 
Absolute rule; […] 
……………………………………………... 
She as a veil down to the slender waist 
Her unadorned golden tresses wore 
Dishevelled, but in wanton ringlets waved 
As the vine curls her tendrils, which implied 
Subjection, but required with gentle sway, 
And by her yielded, by him best received, 
Yielded with coy submission, modest pride, 
And sweet reluctant amorous delay. (4.296-301, 4.304-311) 
This description of Adam and Eve indicates that there are certain inherent hierarchical 
differences between men and women, a notion that is also elaborated on in The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce (Halkett 103-04). An example of these inherent differences between 
men and women is to be seen in Adam’s face, which “expresses greater intelligence, 
curiosity, and heaven-directed vision; these give him “absolute rule” over Eve as well as the 
animals” (Halkett 104). It becomes evident that the love between Adam and Eve is not 
entirely equal, as Adam’s “absolute rule” is made clear by his outward appearance, while 
Eve’s looks imply her “subjection”. Low affirms that “the whole action of the poem, as well 
as many similar passages, confirms that Adam excels in the manly graces, Eve in the 
womanly” (186-87). Miller further explains how 
Milton […] underscores the difference that gender differences make, repeating 
“not equal” twice in line 296 and elaborating on Adam’s contemplative nature 
and his “valor,” which are contrasted with Eve’s “softness” and “sweet 
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attractive grace” (297–98). The line “He for God only, she for God in him” 
further invokes the process of Adam’s initial creation and Eve as a product of 
Adam’s rib; if Adam is once removed from divinity, she is twice removed. 
The twelve lines that follow, which describe their bodies in some detail, then 
fully inscribe the secondary status of Eve. (“Gender” 154) 
In fact, Milton seems to emphasise the differences between Adam and Eve, in particular “the 
distinction in intellectual powers and uses” (Halkett 106-07) in order to argue Adam’s 
superiority and male authority in general, but mostly within marriage. Although both Adam 
and Eve may be equal before God, “their contract rests upon the husband’s superior place” 
(Olmsted 201). Halkett explains that Eve’s speech that follows “continues Milton’s 
presentation of the hierarchical order of marriage”, as “Eve declares that she was made for 
man (“without whom [I] am to no end”), and that she is not equal to Adam, “Preeminent by 
so much odds” (4.447); both ideas are significant repetitions of conventional opinions central 
to Milton’s own divorce tracts” (105-06). Indeed, Eve goes as far as to express her sympathy 
towards Adam, as she views herself as “so far the happier lot, enjoying [Adam]” (4.446), 
while Adam “like consort to [him]self canst nowhere find” (4.448). It seems that Adam’s 
position is one of such superiority that it is rivalled by none except God.  
While Adam and Eve’s description clearly asserts Adam’s superiority as a man, it is 
also ambivalent, in the first place because it appears immediately after a previous description 
of both Adam and Eve as majestic and “godlike” (4.289). Furthermore, although Milton 
attempts to establish Adam’s superiority and absolute rule, it becomes evident that Eve has a 
certain power over Adam. This, of course, is in stark contrast with the core arguments of The 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, which provide a clear description of the different roles 
both men and women should fulfil within marriage. Indeed, although Eve’s outward 
appearance does imply subjection, it comes with a number of conditions: female subjection is 
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“required with gentle sway” and should be “by her yielded” (4.308-09); compulsion does not 
enter the equation. Moreover, Eve’s power over Adam is made clear from her “sweet 
reluctant amorous delay” (4.311). Book 8 of Paradise Lost further elaborates on Eve’s 
characteristics. We learn that Eve’s 
innocence and virgin modesty, 
Her virtue and the conscience of her worth, 
That would be wooed, and not unsought be won, 
Not obvious, not obtrusive, but retired, 
The more desirable […]. (8.501-05) 
Eve indeed possesses all the characteristics of the ideal wife according to The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, but she should “not unsought be won”: again, there are a number of 
conditions to Eve’s loveliness. It becomes apparent that the marriage ideal of Milton as 
described in the divorce tracts is not as readily recognisable in Paradise Lost. Rather than it 
being a straightforward case, the union of Adam and Eve is more frail than Milton’s marriage 
ideal, and made up out of multiple components and conditions. It becomes increasingly 
evident that Paradise Lost is far more nuanced and complex in its portrayal of marriage than 
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce is. Indeed, Miller explains that Paradise Lost “raises, 
rather than always answers, questions about matters like Adam’s primacy, Eve’s sufficiency, 
and the role of gender hierarchy within the household” (“Gender” 152).  
While the description of Adam and Eve discussed in the paragraphs above establishes 
Adam’s “absolute rule” (4.301) over all living beings in Eden, the hierarchical 
companionship within marriage that Milton advances in The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce is not as self-evident in Paradise Lost. Indeed, Eve’s power over Adam becomes 
increasingly clear throughout Paradise Lost, as Adam consistently tends to overvalue Eve’s 
presence and underrate his own (Olmsted 200). Olmsted attributes this to the fact that while 
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Eve came into being from Adam’s ribs, and therefore tends to seek differentiation from him, 
Adam lived without human company before Eve’s creation and therefore responds extremely 
strongly to her presence (200). Indeed, Adam is dependent on Eve and has a propensity to 
attribute overmuch to her because she was created from him. This becomes especially clear 
from Book 4 of Paradise Lost, in which Adam calls Eve to his side after her creation. Truly 
showing his neediness and dependence, Adam asks  
Whom fly’st thou? Whom thou fly’st, of him thou art, 
His flesh, his bone; to give thee being I lent 
Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart 
Substantial life, to have thee by my side 
Henceforth an individual solace dear; 
Part of my soul I seek thee, and thee claim 
My other half […]. (4.481-88) 
Adam depends on Eve for his own happiness and well-being because Eve is created from his 
rib, a place nearest his heart. Adam needs Eve by his side to feel complete himself. Indeed, 
Adam relates to God how man’s only imperfection is an inherent longing for a partner, 
someone to complete him: 
Thou in thyself art perfect, and in thee 
Is no deficience found; not so is man, 
But in degree, the cause of his desire 
By conversation with his like to help, 
Or solace his defects. No need that thou 
Should propagate, already infinite; 
And through all numbers absolute, though one; 
But man by number is to manifest 
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His single imperfection, and beget 
Like of his like, his image multiplied, 
In unity defective, which requires  
Collateral love, and dearest amity. (8.415-26)  
Adam clearly states that men are naturally incomplete and unsatisfied without a partner, a 
notion that is also maintained by Orgel and Goldberg (24). Man’s “single imperfection” is 
especially apparent in Adam, as he truly shows his dependency on Eve by attributing 
overmuch to her and, simultaneously, underrating himself.  Indeed, Eve is frequently 
described by Adam using superlatives only, for instance as Adam’s “sole partner and sole 
part of these joys” (4.411), to Adam, “dearer thyself than all” (4.412), “my fairest, my 
espoused, my latest found, / Heaven’s last best gift, my ever new delight” (5.18-19), and 
“best image of my self and dearer half” (5.95).  
Indeed, Adam’s dependency on Eve becomes increasingly evident throughout Book 8 
of Paradise Lost, as Adam relates his feelings when Eve was created by God: 
The rib he formed and fashioned with his hands; 
Under his forming hands a creature grew, 
Manlike, but different sex, so lovely fair, 
That what seemed fair in all the world, seemed now 
Mean, or in her summed up, in her contained 
And in her looks, which from that time infused  
Sweetness into my heart, unfelt before, 
And into all things from her air inspired 
The spirit of love and amorous delight. (8.469-77) 
This is a prime example of Adam’s propensity to attribute overmuch to Eve. Although Eve is 
indeed created lovely and fair, Adam states that everything else around him loses its 
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attraction and fades in Eve’s presence, a comparison that seems somewhat exaggerated 
considering they are in the “delicious Paradise” (4.132) of Eden. Adam goes on to explain to 
Raphael that 
[…] here passion first I felt, 
Commotion strange, in all enjoyments else 
Superior and unmoved, here only weak 
Against the charm of beauty’s powerful glance. (8.530-33) 
Eve’s beauty inspires passion in Adam, leaving him feeling inferior while he should, 
according to The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, be the superior one in their relationship. 
Even though Adam “understand[s] in the prime end / Of nature her [Eve] the inferior” (8.540-
41) and realises Eve is “in outward show / Elaborate, of inward less exact” (8.538-39), he still 
finds himself in awe before her. Remarkably enough, Adam seems aware of how susceptible 
he is to Eve’s loveliness, and hints to a possible cause, stating 
Or nature failed in me, and left some part 
Not proof enough such object to sustain, 
Or from my side subducting, took perhaps 
More than enough […]. (8.534-37) 
Adam goes on to accord all superiority to Eve, stating that because of her exceptional beauty, 
every single thing she does  
Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best; 
All higher knowledge in her presence falls 
Degraded, wisdom in discourse with her 
Loses discountenanced, and like folly shows […]. (8.550-53) 
Bestowing all excellence and superiority upon Eve, Adam inverts the whole order of nature 
and distorts Milton’s marriage ideal as presented in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. 
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The passage above only serves to emphasise Adam’s dependency on Eve: Adam repeatedly 
overvalues her presence, while underrating his own.  
Raphael observes Adam’s vulnerability with regard to Eve, and rebukes him, advising 
Adam to realise his place of superiority and to remain conscious of this fact in order to 
maintain his natural authority (Halkett 119-20): 
Accuse not nature, she hath done her part; 
Do thou but thine, and be not diffident 
Of wisdom, she deserts thee not if thou 
Dismiss not her, when most thou need’st her nigh, 
By attributing overmuch to things 
Less excellent, as thou thy self perceiv’st. (8.561-66) 
Raphael recognises Adam’s propensity to attribute “overmuch” to Eve, and warns Adam that 
he should learn how to exercise wisdom in judgement and not be overcome by passion so that 
Eve “will acknowledge thee [Adam] her head” (8.574). Adam seems to have an inherent 
inclination towards uxoriousness that is an innate part of his character and creation. Indeed, 
Diane McColley explains that “before the Fall it is always Eve who willingly raises the issue 
of Adam’s marital headship, never Adam”: in fact, Adam, “far from asserting his headship, is 
only too prone to forget it” (qtd. in Low 186-87). Clearly, the marriage ideal of The Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce is not as apparent and readily acceptable in Paradise Lost: indeed, 
it is rather delicate in Adam’s case, as he constantly needs to be reminded of his superior 
position.  
Indeed, even after the Fall, Adam is still shown to be in awe of Eve, addressing and 
describing her in superlative terms. Although Eve has strayed from his side against his will, 
and eaten from the Tree of Knowledge, Adam still refers to her as  
fairest of creation, last and best 
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Of all God’s works, creature in whom excelled 
Whatever can to sight or thought be formed, 
Holy, divine, good, amiable, or sweet! (9.896-900) 
Furthermore, his neediness becomes more apparent than ever, as he contemplates his own lot. 
Because Eve was created from Adam’s rib, Adam needs her to feel complete. In fact, to 
Adam, they are inextricably linked, and one cannot survive without the other. We learn that 
Adam is determined to fall together with Eve, as he cannot imagine any other scenario: 
However I with thee have fixed my lot, 
Certain to undergo like doom, if death 
Consort with thee, death is to me as life; 
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The bond of nature draw me to my own, 
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine; 
Our state cannot be severed, we are one, 
One flesh; to lose thee were to lose my self. (9.952-59)  
It becomes clear that Adam is utterly dependent on Eve and seeks no differentiation from her 
whatsoever. Indeed, his inclination towards uxoriousness seems to be an inherent part of his 
character and his creation, something which he himself becomes increasingly mindful of, as 
he states “perhaps / I also erred in overmuch admiring / What seemed in thee [Eve] so 
perfect” (9.1177-79). Adam is finally seen to recognise his own propensity to attribute 
overmuch to Eve. Evidently, Milton’s marriage ideal as described in The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce and the proper roles for men and women that it involves are not as 
clear-cut and straightforward in Paradise Lost.  
While Adam and Eve’s relationship in Paradise Lost is based on the traditional and 
hierarchical differences between men and women, their relationship evolves: Radetsky-
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Hampel asserts this, stating that “at first, Adam’s love is declared superior as is his intellect, 
and Eve is content to serve her husband. Later, Eve will prove intellectually more 
venturesome and the more visibly loving of the two” (17). Indeed, Eve’s intellectual prowess 
shows in multiple moments in Paradise Lost, for instance in Book 4 of the poem when Eve 
starts composing a sonnet in Adam’s honour. With her poetry, Eve attempts to give tribute to 
Adam: Hillier explains that “Eve’s lyric to Adam is a declaration of her conjugal love and 
devotion and an acknowledgement that the bounty Eden pours forth for her is as nothing 
when measured against the sweetness she derives from her spousal companionship, 
“imparadis’t” with Adam” (1-2). Eve confesses to Adam that 
With thee conversing I forget all time, 
All seasons and their change, all please alike. 
Sweet is the breath of morn, her rising sweet, 
With charm of earliest birds; pleasant the sun 
When first on this delightful land he spreads 
His orient beams, on herb, tree, fruit, and flower, 
Glistering with dew; fragrant the fertile earth 
After soft showers; and sweet the coming on 
Of grateful evening mild, then silent night 
With this her solemn bird and this fair moon, 
And these the gems of heaven, her starry train: 
But neither breath of morn when she ascends 
With charm of earliest birds, nor rising sun 
On this delightful land, nor herb, fruit, flower, 
Glistering with dew, nor fragrance after showers,  
Nor grateful evening mild, nor silent night 
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With this her solemn bird, nor walk by moon, 
Or glittering starlight without thee is sweet. (4.639-56) 
The essence of Eve’s sonnet is a celebration of Adam and a description of how her entire 
well-being and happiness depends on Adam’s presence. Hillier further explains that 
Eve defines her state of happiness and bliss as being dependent upon the 
continuing presence of Adam in Eden. The form of Eve’s mirror poem 
conveys that in her eyes the only object in Eden that for her truly makes up 
“the sum of earthly bliss” (8.522) is not […] her own self-image, but rather her 
companionship with and love for Adam and her admiration of the goodness 
that she finds reflected in him. (4) 
Although Eve indeed declares her devotion to and dependency on Adam in the sonnet, it 
simultaneously undermines the gender politics of Paradise Lost. Eve, who is supposed to be 
the inferior part of the union of Adam and herself, suddenly becomes the authority of the text. 
Furthermore, the sonnet is part of a long manly tradition of poetry, which renders this scene 
ambivalent. By having Eve compose the sonnet, Milton uses Eve rather than Adam as a 
mouthpiece for himself: she becomes the figure in the text who resembles Milton the poet 
most. This is an ambiguous and seemingly deliberate complication of, and deviation from, 
Adam and Eve’s traditional roles.  
Furthermore, it is in the separation scene that Eve truly proves to be the more 
intellectually adventurous and daring of the two. As explained in my chapter on 
Areopagitica, Eve truly shows her argumentative vigour in the separation scene and proves to 
be a formidable contender in the debate with Adam (Murphy 64). Indeed, Eve controls the 
debate from beginning to completion and is finally able to reveal her intellectual prowess. 
Eve’s suggestion to divide their labours (9.214) leaves Adam noticeably anxious and 
insecure, thinking he is to blame. He tells Eve 
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[…] but if much converse perhaps 
Thee satiate, to short absence I could yield. 
For solitude sometimes is best society, 
And short retirement urges sweet return. (9.247-50) 
Again, it becomes clear that Adam tends to overvalue Eve’s presence, and underrate his own. 
Adam is left feeling anxious and insecure as Eve seeks differentiation from him. Adam goes 
on to remind Eve of her wifely duties according to Milton’s marriage ideal: 
[…] leave not the faithful side 
That gave thee being, still shades thee and protects. 
The wife, where danger or dishonor lurks, 
Safest and seemliest by her husband stays, 
Who guards her […]. (9.265-69) 
Eve is noticeably offended, replying “that thou should my firmness […] doubt / To God or 
thee […] / […] I expected not to hear” (9.279-81). Eve interprets Adam’s warning as 
undervaluing her own powers to resist evil and temptation, which hardens her wish to prove 
her steadfastness (Olmsted 202). Miller states that although “it may be “seemliest” for a 
“submiss” wife to remain with her husband, […] Eve suspends this hierarchy by deploying 
Adam’s response to her thoughts about individual trial, and invoking Milton’s own language, 
to justify her departure” (“Gender” 159). Adam has no choice but to tell Eve 
But if thou think, trial unsought may find 
Us both securer than thus warned thou seem’st, 
Go; for thy stay, not free, absents thee more; 
Go in thy native innocence, rely 
On what thou hast of virtue, summon all, 
For God towards thee hath done his part, do thine. (9.370-75) 
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Bowers states that Adam’s response to Eve’s Areopagitica speech is “bad doctrine, for in his 
role as protector Adam had no right to relieve himself from his responsibility to Eve by 
making her a free agent. In so doing he failed in his duty both to her and to God” (271). 
Halkett agrees with this claim, claiming that in letting Eve make her own choice, Adam 
resigns his proper office as husband (130-31) and breaks the hierarchical chain of being, 
enabling Eve to temporarily assume the dominant role in their relationship and ultimately 
persuade Adam to sin (Bowers 267, Halkett 123). 
Bower and Halkett read Adam and Eve’s relationship as static, suggesting it is in 
perfect compliance with Milton’s marriage ideal as put forward in The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce. It is reductive, however, to claim that Adam allowing Eve to work 
alone is bad doctrine because he resigns his proper position of superiority as husband while 
doing so. Eve’s reasons for working independently of and separately from Adam are all 
cogent, and, moreover, ones that Milton himself presents in Areopagitica. Indeed, Eve proves 
to be more attuned to the principles of Areopagitica than Adam is, and actually uses her 
superior intelligence in this area to justify her departure. In allowing Eve to go, Adam bases 
himself on the notion of free will (“Go; for thy stay, not free, absents thee more” (9.372)) and 
actually sounds a great deal like Milton himself. Adam’s insistence on Eve’s freedom cannot 
be so easily dismissed as wrong-headed, as both Bowers and Halkett attempt to do. It 
becomes increasingly clear that rather than being a confirmation of the gender issues of the 
divorce tracts, Paradise Lost complicates much of the argument put forward in Milton’s 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.  
The ambiguous relationship between Paradise Lost and The Doctrine and Discipline 
of Divorce remains apparent throughout the poem: indeed, Paradise Lost ends on an 
ambivalent note with regard to its gender politics. When the archangel Michael and Adam 
return from their talk, Eve, through a dream sent by God, is shown to already be aware of 
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everything that has passed. This is in stark contrast with Eve in Book 8 of Paradise Lost, who 
voluntarily leaves the room when Adam and Raphael speak. We know that this is not due to a 
lack of intelligence, but rather because Eve prefers Adam to be her narrator:  
Yet went she not, as not with such discourse 
Delighted, or not capable her ear 
Of what was high: such pleasure she reserved, 
Adam relating, she sole auditress; 
Her husband the relater she preferred 
Before the angel […]. (8.48-51) 
Yet now, in the final book of Paradise Lost, Eve already has received the same information 
as Adam. In fact, she is again presented as the authority figure and the one most intellectually 
venturous within the text, as Eve is the one who is tasked with further explaining the notion 
of a “paradise within” (12.587) to Adam. Eve explains: 
Whence thou return’st, and whither went’st, I know; 
For God is also in sleep, and dreams advise, 
Which he hath sent propitious, some great good 
Presaging, since with sorrow and heart’s distress 
Wearied I fell asleep: but now lead on; 
In me is no delay; with thee to go, 
Is to stay here; without thee here to stay, 
Is to go hence unwilling; thou to me 
Art all things under heaven, all places thou, 
Who for my wilful crime art banished hence. 
This further consolation yet secure 
I carry hence; though all by me is lost, 
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Such favour I unworthy am vouchsafed, 
By me the promised seed shall all restore. (12.610-23) 
Not only is Eve the one who has the final world of the entire poem, she – supposedly inferior, 
submissive, and lacking intelligence – is the one who is able to articulate and elaborate on 
what a “paradise within” truly entails. Indeed, “when Adam returns from his dialogue with 
Michael, the cryptic prophecy of the “paradise within” still perhaps perplexing him, Eve 
greets him with a complementary prophecy, […] clarifying the salient points of Michael’s 
message” (Held 173). All Adam does is stand idly by, agreeing without speaking further: 
indeed, we learn that “Adam heard / Well pleased, but answered not” (12.624-25). McGrath 
argues that “Eve’s role in conveying such critical, redemptive information undermines gender 
hierarchy” (72) as Eve is shown to be truly intellectually venturous and far more assertive 
than Adam. Indeed, Eve has the final authoritative say in Paradise Lost, which highlights the 
ambiguous nature of Paradise Lost and how it is a clear re-examination rather than a simple 
confirmation of the gender issues of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. 
 
2.5 The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce and Paradise Lost: Conclusion 
The nature of the relationship between The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce and Paradise 
Lost is ambivalent. Indeed, although many scholars view Paradise Lost as a confirmation of 
the core principles of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, I argue that rather, the poem 
re-examines many of the issues from the divorce tracts. This becomes clear from a number of 
things, the first of which being the portrayal of Eve and females in general in the poem. 
Although Eve is initially strongly associated with the Fall, – being accompanied by 
ambiguous phrases and fallen images – her entire image of sinful seductress is undermined at 
the end of the poem. Book 11 travels in a new direction and points at the “effeminate 
slackness” of men as the root of all problems in marriage, something which is in stark 
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contrast with the core principles and ideas of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. 
Furthermore, Adam and Eve’s union is described ambivalently. Although they are initially 
presented as two equal beings, it becomes clear that there are certain hierarchical differences 
between men and women. However, these hierarchical differences are not as straightforward: 
Eve’s submissiveness and meekness, for example, comes with a number of conditions. It 
becomes evident that Milton’s marriage ideal is not nearly as straightforward in Paradise 
Lost as in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: the union of Adam and Eve is much more 
frail and less self-evident. Indeed, Adam tends to overvalue Eve, attributing overmuch to her 
while underrating himself. At the same time, Eve showcases her intellectual prowess by 
composing a sonnet in Adam’s honour, in the separation scene and by having the final word 
in Paradise Lost. Throughout the poem, then, there are various elements and moments that 
undermine the gender politics of Paradise Lost and highlight the ambiguous nature of the 
reworking of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce in Paradise Lost.   
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Conclusion 
Stanley Fish banishes any existence of doubt in Milton’s writing, claiming that “in Milton’s 
world […] there are no moral ambiguities, because there are no equally compelling values. 
There is only one value – the value of obedience – and not only is it a mistake to grant 
independence to values other than the value of obedience, it is a temptation” (qtd. in Herman 
and Sauer 11). This thesis has sought to complicate this view: not only is Paradise Lost itself 
replete with ambiguous moments, but Milton’s poem is especially equivocal in relation to his 
earlier prose works Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. This thesis has 
attempted to demonstrate the ambiguous nature of the reworking of these prose works in 
Paradise Lost. Indeed, as elaborated on in the analysis of both prose works, many of the core 
arguments that Milton proposes in Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce 
are undermined, complicated or weakened in Paradise Lost. This is especially true with 
regard to Milton’s conception of gender: while his portrayal of gender and marriage in his 
divorce tracts has often lead scholars to view Milton as either a progressive or a misogynist, 
Paradise Lost offers the possibility of a different reading. Furthermore, notions such as free 
will and individual responsibility, crucial to Milton’s argument in Areopagitica, are also 
revisited and re-evaluated by Milton in Paradise Lost.  
In Paradise Lost, for example, Milton purposely undermines the gender politics of 
Areopagitica by initially employing Eve as his mouthpiece in the poem and having her repeat 
the core arguments of the pamphlet. However, moments later, it becomes evident that Eve 
does not fully grasp Areopagitica’s core principles; and Eve no longer seems to be 
functioning as Milton’s representative in the poem when Adam shifts all responsibility for the 
Fall on Eve and requires her to supplicate before he is able to take up his individual 
responsibility. While Paradise Lost initially seems to open up the gender politics of 
Areopagitica, the male authority of the tract returns in its entirety with Adam branding the 
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female gender as weak and in need of protection and guidance. Still, in the separation scene, 
Eve proves to be intellectually far more venturesome than Adam, which only highlights the 
ambiguity of the reworking of Areopagitica in Paradise Lost.  
As for the reworking of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce in Paradise Lost, 
this, too, is rife with contradiction and ambivalence. While Eve is repeatedly associated with 
fallen images and at multiple occasions described as inferior to Adam (which seems to 
correspond with Milton’s divorce tracts), she also demonstrates her intellectual prowess in 
the separation scene and in the final moments of Paradise Lost, and by composing a sonnet in 
Adam’s honour. Adam’s portrayal, too, is an indicator of Paradise Lost’s ambiguity: while he 
is described as superior and gifted with higher intelligence, Adam also displays an inclination 
towards uxoriousness throughout Paradise Lost. Evidently, the union of Adam and Eve in 
Paradise Lost is far less self-evident and straightforward than Milton’s marriage ideal as 
described in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.  Throughout the poem, there are various 
elements and moments that highlight the ambiguous nature of the reworking of The Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce in Paradise Lost. 
As I have tried to show, Paradise Lost is not merely a simple confirmation of the 
arguments put forward in Areopagitica and The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: on the 
contrary, Milton re-examines and reviews much of the ideas of these prose works in Paradise 
Lost, rendering the poem highly ambiguous. I have attempted to show that Milton’s idea of 
gender especially is ever fluctuating: indeed, there is not a single Miltonic conception of 
gender available. Rather, his views and ideas on gender vary over time, in different works, 
and even within a poem like Paradise Lost itself: Milton returns to the issue of gender 
numerous times within his works, but he never seems to adopt a stable, definitive view on it. 
This thesis, then, has attempted to display and highlight the ambiguity in Paradise Lost 
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(especially with regard to gender) and is therefore a perfect example of the newer trend 
within Milton scholarship towards stressing discontinuity and contradiction in Milton’s work.  
 
 
 
  
Lachhab 74 
 
Bibliography 
Bowers, Fredson. “Adam, Eve, and the Fall in ‘Paradise Lost.’” PMLA, vol. 84, no. 2, 1969, 
pp. 264–273.  
Blasi, Vincent. “Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment.” Occasional 
Papers (1995): 6. 
Chaplin, Gregory. ““One Flesh, One Heart, One Soul”: Renaissance Friendship and Miltonic 
Marriage.” Modern Philology 99.2 (2001): 266-292. 
Chernaik, Warren. “The Known Rules of Antient Libertie.” The European Legacy 17:3 
(2012):317-331.  
Cotterell, Arthur. “Osiris.” A Dictionary of World Mythology.: Oxford University Press, 
1997. Oxford Reference. 2003. Date Accessed 16 Oct. 2017 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780192177476.001.0001/acref-
9780192177476-e-50>. 
Dobranski, Stephen B. “Afterlife.” The Cambridge Introduction to Milton. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2012. 195-209. Print.  
---. “Prose.” The Cambridge Introduction to Milton. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 94-
140. Print. 
Erickson, Sandra S. Fernandes. “The Ethics of Gender in Milton’s Paradise Lost.” 
Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 5.06 (2010): 155-170. 
Espejo, José Luis Martínez-Dueñas. “Rhetorical Tradition and the Argument of Separation: 
Milton’s The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.” SEDERI: Journal of the Spanish 
Society for English Renaissance Studies 8 (1997): 47-54. Web. 
Evans, J. Martin. “Critical Responses, Recent.” Milton in Context. Ed. Stephen B. Dobranski. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print. 
Flotats, Rosa. “Knowledge and Science in Paradise Lost.” Sederi 7 (1996): 165-171. 
Lachhab 75 
 
Fulton, Thomas. “Areopagitica: Books, Reading, and Context.” Historical Milton: 
Manuscript, Print, and Political Culture in Revolutionary England. Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 2010. Print.   
Halkett, John. Milton and the Idea of Matrimony: A Study of the Divorce Tracts and Paradise 
Lost. New Haven: Yale UP, 1970. Print. 
Held, J. R. “Eve’s “paradise within” in Paradise Lost: A Stoic Mind, a Love Sonnet, and a 
Good Conscience.” Studies in Philology, vol. 114 no. 1, 2017, pp. 171-196. Project 
MUSE. 
Herman, Peter C., and Elizabeth Sauer. “Paradigms Lost, Paradigms Found: The New Milton 
Criticism.” The New Milton Criticism. Ed. Peter C. Herman and Elizabeth Sauer. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 1-22. Print. 
Hillier, Russell M. ““A Happy Rural Seat of Various View”: Eve's Mirror Poem and Her 
Lapse in Paradise Lost.” Milton Quarterly 48.1 (2014): 1-14. Web. 
Hoxby, Blair. “Areopagitica and Liberty.” The Oxford Handbook of Milton: Oxford 
University Press, 2011-11-10. Oxford Handbooks Online. 2012-09-18. 
Kerrigan, William, John Peter Rumrich and Stephen M. Fallon, eds. Introduction to 
Selections from The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. The Essential Prose of John 
Milton. New York: Modern Library, 2007. Print. 
Keymer, Thomas. “Wollstonecraft and Milton on Divorce.” Notes and Queries 57.4 (2010): 
563-65. Web. 
Low, Anthony. “John Milton: “Haile Wedded Love”.” The Reinvention of Love: Poetry, 
Politics and Culture from Sidney to Milton. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. 178-201. 
Web. 
Lachhab 76 
 
Martin, Catherine Gimelli. “Dalila, Misogyny, and Milton's Christian Liberty of Divorce.” 
Milton and Gender. Ed. Catherine Gimelli Martin. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 53-
74. Print. 
---. “Introduction: Milton's Gendered Subjects.” Milton and Gender. Ed. Catherine Gimelli 
Martin. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 1-16. Print. 
McGrath, Patrick J. “Formal Resistance: Gender Hierarchy and Eve’s Final Speech in 
Paradise Lost.” Milton Quarterly 47.2 (2013): 72-87. Web. 
Miller, Shannon. “Gender.” The Cambridge Companion to Paradise Lost. Ed. Louis 
Schwartz. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014. Print. 
---. “Serpentine Eve: Milton and the Seventeenth‐Century Debate Over Women.” Milton 
Quarterly 42.1 (2008): 44-68. Web. 
Milton, John. “Areopagitica”. The Essential Prose of John Milton. Ed. William Kerrigan, 
John Peter Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon. New York: Modern Library, 2007. Print. 
---. Paradise Lost. Ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 
Print. 
---. “Selections from The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.” The Essential Prose of John 
Milton. Ed. William Kerrigan, John Peter Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon. New York: 
Modern Library, 2007. Print. 
Murphy, Genna. ““E(a)ve’sdropping” in “Paradise Lost”: Knowledge and Disobedience in 
Eve.” Acadia University (Canada), 2007. Ann Arbor: ProQuest. Web. 27 Sep. 2017. 
Olmsted, Wendy. The Imperfect Friend: Emotion and Rhetoric in Sidney, Milton, and Their 
Contexts. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008. Print. 
Orgel, Stephen and Jonathan Goldberg, eds. Introduction. Paradise Lost. Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2004. Print. 
Lachhab 77 
 
Polydorou, Desma. “Gender and Spiritual Equality in Marriage: A Dialogic Reading of 
Rachel Speght and John Milton.” Milton Quarterly 35.1 (2001): 22-32. Web. 
Purkiss, Diane. “Whose Liberty? The Rhetoric of Milton's Divorce Tracts.” Oxford 
Handbooks Online. 2012-09-18. Oxford University Press. 
Radetsky-Hampel, Sharon. Daily Decencies: Ideas of Marriage and Divorce in Milton’s 
Prose and “Paradise Lost” (1997): ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. Web. 
Rumrich, John Peter. “Critical Responses, Early.” Milton in Context. Ed. Stephen B. 
Dobranski. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print. 
---. “The Question of Context.” Milton Unbound: Controversy and Reinterpretation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 24-49. Print. 
Schmiga, Friederike. “Knowledge After the Fall: Milton and the Question of Censorship.” 
Political Poetry across the Centuries (2016): 57. 
Whittington, Leah. ““Thy humiliation shall exalt”: Hierarchy and Reconciliation in Milton’s 
Paradise Lost.” Renaissance Suppliants: Poetry, Antiquity, Reconciliation. Oxford 
University Press, 2016-05-01. Oxford Scholarship Online. 2016-08-18. 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/10.1093/acprof:oso
/9780198754442.001.0001/acprof-9780198754442-chapter-5>. 
Wittreich, Joseph. “Afterword.” The New Milton Criticism. Ed. Peter C. Herman and 
Elizabeth Sauer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012. 231-48. Print. 
---. “Inspir’d with Contradiction: Mapping Gender Discourses in Paradise Lost.” Literary 
Milton: Text, Pretext, Context. Ed. Michael Lieb and Diana Treviño Benet. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1994. Print.  
Ziegelmann, Richard, and Singh, Jyotsna G. ‘She for God in Him’: A Comparative 
Evaluation of “Paradise Lost” and Milton’s Approach to Woman (2003): ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. Print. 
